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Do Juries Add Value?: Evidence from an Empirical Study of
Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts
Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P. Miller*
Abstract:
We study jury trial waivers in a data set of 2,816 contracts contained as exhibits in Form
8-K filings by reporting corporations during 2002. Because these contracts are associated with
events deemed material to the financial condition of SEC-reporting firms, they likely are carefully
negotiated by sophisticated, well-informed parties and thus provide presumptive evidence about
the value associated with the availability of jury trials. Only a small minority of contracts, about
20 percent, waived jury trials. An additional nine percent of contracts had arbitration clauses that
effectively preclude jury trials though the reason for arbitration clauses need not specifically
relate to juries. We explore three groups of factors to explain the pattern of jury trial waivers: (1)
contract-specific factors: the subject matter of a contract, a measure of its standardization, choice
of law, and choice of forum, (2) contracting-party factors: domestic vs. international status, place
of business, place of incorporation, attorney locale, and industry, and (3) factors external to the
contracts and parties: perceptions of local jury fairness in the forum specified in the contract and
the relative length of jury and bench trial queues in that forum. Contract-type is significantly
associated with jury trial waivers. For example, over 50 percent of security agreements and over
60 percent of credit commitments waived jury trials. In contrast, only five percent of
employment contracts, two percent of bond indentures, and 3.5 percent of pooling service
agreements waived jury trials. Choice of forum, greater contract standardization, and perceived
fairness of juries are significantly associated with jury trial waivers. Over 80 percent of the
contracts designating Illinois as a forum contained jury trial waivers whereas less than half the
contracts designating New York as a forum, and only about one-third of the contracts designating
California, Texas, or Florida as a forum contained waiver clauses. Jury trial waivers were not
more common in international contracts. Our results suggest that, contrary to a widespread
perception about the alleged inadequacies of juries in complex business cases, sophisticated
actors may perceive that juries often add value to dispute resolution.

I. Introduction
Commercial contracts frequently contain agreements about how the parties wish
to resolve disputes that may arise under the contract. One such ex ante provision for
dispute resolution is an agreement to waive the right to a jury. Such waivers will

*

Eisenberg is Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Miller is Stuyvesant P. Comfort
Professor of Law, NYU Law School. We thank Mark Geistfeld, John Duffy, Clay Gillette, Sam Issacharoff,
Linda Silberman, and Martin Wells for comments and Natalie Erbe, Jeremy Masys, Sergio Muro, Hilel
Pohulanik, Whitney Schwab, Nadav Weg and Cathy Weist for valuable research assistance.

ordinarily be enforced, provided they are found to be knowing and deliberate.1

Given

widespread beliefs that juries do not perform well in complex commercial cases,2 we
might suppose that ex ante jury trial waivers would be nearly universally observed in
major business contracts.

1

The Seventh Amendment provides parties litigating in federal court with a right to jury trial in civil cases.
U.S. Constitution, Amend. VII. Many state constitutions also guarantee jury trial rights in civil cases. See,
e.g., Cal. Const. art. I, §16. The right to a jury can be waived however, and such waivers will generally be
recognized and enforced in American courts. Waivers of jury trial are routinely enforced in the context of
civil and criminal litigation. In federal civil cases, for example, the right to jury trial is waived if not
specifically demanded in timely fashion, and may be waived by consent of both parties. FRCP Rule 38, 39.
Some states, however, provide the court with discretion to reject a jury trial waiver and impose a jury on
the parties in a civil case. See, e.g., Miss. Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b) (“The court may, in its discretion,
require that the action be tried by a jury notwithstanding the stipulation of waiver.”). Juries may also be
waived in criminal cases, providing the waiver is knowing and deliberate; indeed, such waivers are implicit
in plea bargaining, which is the principal means for resolving criminal charges. See Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238 (1969).
Pre-dispute contractual waivers of jury trial are also enforced in federal court. Waivers of jury
trial are implicit in the decision to submit disputes to arbitration, and courts, relying on policies under the
Federal Arbitration Act, generally enforce such waivers under general principles of contract law without
requiring any heightened showing of consent. See, e.g., Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d
1359 (11th Cir. 2005). But see Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 381 (6th Cir.
2005) (holding arbitration agreement waiver of jury right to higher standard than ordinary contract
principles). Federal courts also enforce pre-dispute jury trial waivers a outside the context of arbitration
agreements, at least if the agreement is knowing and voluntary. See Debra T. Landis, Contractual Jury
Trial Waivers in Federal Civil Cases, 92 A.L.R. Fed. 688 (2003) (“The cases . . . uniformly support the
view that, with knowing and voluntary consent, the right to a jury trial in a federal civil action may be
waived by a contract that was not made in, or as an incident of, any particular litigation.”); Leasing Serv.
Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832 (4th Cir.1986); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755 (6th
Cir.1985); Rodenbur v. Kaufmann, 320 F.2d 679, 683 (D.C.Cir.1963); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191
F.Supp.2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2002). But see Deborah J. Matties, A Case for Judicial Self-Restraint in
Interpreting Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Court 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 431, 462-63 (1997)
(urging judicial restraint in enforcing ex ante jury waivers).
The majority of state courts also enforce pre-dispute jury trial waivers. See Jay M. Zitter,
Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in State Civil Cases, 42 A.L.R.5th 53, 71 (1996); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004); Mall, Inc. v. Robbins, 412 So.2d 1197, 1200 (Ala.1982); L & R
Realty v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 246 Conn. 1, 715 A.2d 748, 754-755 (1998); Malan Realty Investors,
Inc. v. Harris, 953 S.W.2d 624, 626- 627 (Mo.1997) (en banc) (per curiam); Lowe Enters. Residential
Partners, L.P. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 118 Nev. 92, 40 P.3d 405 (2002); Rhode Island Depositors
Econ. Prot. Corp. v. Coffey and Martinelli, Ltd., 821 A.2d 222, 226 (R.I. 2003). Two states — California
and Georgia — reject pre-dispute waivers as inconsistent with applicable statutes. See Grafton Partners
L.P. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.4th 944, 116 P.3d 479, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 5 (2005); Bank South, N.A. v.
Howard, 264 Ga. 339, 444 S.E.2d 799 (1994).
2
See text accompanying notes 59-79 infra.
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This paper reports on the first large-scale empirical study of jury trial waivers in
large commercial contracts.3 We find that such waivers are far from universal. Explicit
jury trial waivers were contained in only about 20 percent of the more than 2,800
contracts in our data set.

Another nine percent of contracts contained mandatory

arbitration clauses. Such clauses may well be adopted for reasons other than a wish to
avoid a jury; indeed, they almost certainly have other motivations because if their only
purpose were to avoid a jury, this goal could be achieved more parsimoniously with a
simple jury waiver.4

But even if arbitration clauses are classed as jury waivers, a

substantial majority of the contracts in our study—over 70 percent—do not preclude
juries.
What causes the relative paucity of jury trial waivers in our data? Possible
explanations include agency costs, strategic considerations, and transactions costs. It is
also possible—perhaps likely—that the parties omit jury trial waivers simply because
they see the potential availability of a jury as adding value to the contract. Because the
parties in our data set are sophisticated business entities negotiating over important
contracts, their revealed preferences about jury trial waivers may provide evidence
bearing on the ongoing debate about the value of civil juries in commercial litigation.
Given that jury trial waivers are not universally observed, the question arises
whether one can explain the varying pattern of waiver clauses. Two major classes of
factors—those internal to the contracts themselves and those external to the contracts—
3

See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation by Contract Design, 115 Yale L.J. 814,
857 (2006) (noting that contract law scholars “focus principally on the substantive terms” of contracts
rather than on ex ante mechanisms for enforcement, and characterizing the investigation of such
mechanisms as a “rich avenue for future research.”)
4
See J. Michael McGuire & Adam S. Belzberg, Are Jury Trial Waivers Coming of Age?, 38 Maryland Bar
J. 25 (2006) (noting that employers can avoid juries by jury trial waivers without needing to include
arbitration clauses in employment contracts).
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might help explain the pattern. At the descriptive level, we find strong associations
between internal contractual factors and the rate of jury trial waivers. The type of
contract is in fact the most powerful factor in describing the variation in jury trial waiver
rates. Credit contracts—credit commitments and security agreements—have the highest
rate of jury waiver clauses, both over 50 percent. In contrast, for example, about five
percent of employment contracts contain jury waivers and about ten percent of licensing
contracts contain waivers.

Another factor internal to the contracts, the degree of

standardization, also is associated with jury trial waivers.
standardization are associated with lower waiver rates.

Contracts with low

Choice of forum is also

associated with jury trial waiver rates.
External forces on waiver clauses can be further subdivided.

Some are

characteristics of the contracting parties—place of business, place of incorporation,
attorney locale, and indsutry all might relate to the waiver rate. Other external factors are
more clearly exogenous to the contract relation being assessed. These external factors
include the perceived fairness of juries in the locale in which adjudication is likely to
occur. Parties may systematically shun juries in locales in which they perceive juries to
be unfair. Expected costs of jury trials may also vary across geographical areas. Locales
in which jury trials have a much longer queue than bench trials increase the cost of jury
trials relative to bench trials and may be expected to be associated with higher jury trial
waiver rates. We find an association between perceived jury fairness and jury trial
waiver rates but no robust association between the difference in jury and bench trial
queues and waiver rates.

4

Part II of this article describes the relevant background to studying jury trial
waivers and articulates the hypotheses relating to internal and external influences that we
test. Part III describes the data and Parts IV and V report the results. Part VI discusses
the results and Part VII concludes.

II. Background and Hypotheses
Few issues in American law have sparked more academic and political debate
than the question of the value and accuracy of juries, and in particular the issue whether
juries can competently perform the fact-finding function in complex commercial
litigation. The business community has been hostile towards juries in tort cases, viewing
juries as one of the principal causes, along with greedy plaintiffs, unscrupulous attorneys,
and activist judges, of a purported litigation explosion that is supposedly undermining the
social fabric and harming the economy. Although this view has questionable empirical
support,5 employers,6 large corporations,7 and residential landlords8 (among others)
perceive themselves to be especially at risk of excessive or arbitrary jury verdicts based
on hostility to deep-pocket defendants or sympathy for injured plaintiffs. According to
the dominant view in the business community,9 juries increase the risks of trials because
they decide the questions put to them on the basis of legally irrelevant factors rather than
5

For a discussion (and rebuttal) of this view, see Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and
the Thirty Years War, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1255, 1266 (2005). See also authorities cited in notes 74-79 infra.
6
See Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, Disp. Resol. J., Jan. 1997, at 8, 7879.
7
Galanter, supra note 5, at 1266.
8
Jury trial waivers are strongly recommended for landlords in residential lease agreements, on the theory
that juries are likely to side with renters as against deep-pocket landlords. See Alvin L. Arnold & Jeanne
O'Neill, Real Estate Leasing Practice Manual § 40:11 (2006) (“One type of waiver that invariably appears
in most leases is the waiver by the lessee of a right to trial by jury in connection with disputes arising out of
the lease.”).
9
This view appears to be widely shared among corporate executives and business lawyers. John Lande,
Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers’ and Executives’ Opinions, 3 Harv. Negot. L.
Rev. 1, 51-52 (1998).
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according to the evidence and applicable law.10 Businesses’ concerns about jury fairness
are accompanied by the likely perception that jury trials are on average more costly than
judge trials. In a jury trial, juries must be selected, jury consultants may be employed,
evidentiary and in limine issues are likely to be more complex, and cases may take longer
to come to trial.11 Thus, independent of perceptions of the perceived quality of juries’
performance, we suspect that most observers would regard jury trials as expected to be
more costly than bench trials.
Much of the concern about jury trials is with respect to cases between injured
plaintiffs and large businesses. Businesses may be especially fearful of juries’ treatment
of them in cases with sympathetic individual plaintiffs. Such cases are not likely to arise
under the contracts in our sample, with the possible exception of employment contracts.
The vast majority of the studied contracts are between substantial corporate entities.
Nevertheless, fear of juries may well be observed even in corporate dominated contracts.
Juries have awarded very large damages in disputes involving businesses,12 and business

10

See Galanter, supra note 5, at 1266-67.
The evidence in federal courts is that jury-tried cases are on the docket for shorter periods than judgetried cases. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Which is Speedier?, 79
Judicature 176 (Jan.-Feb. 1996); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:
Transcending Empiricism: Trial by Jury or Judge, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1124, 1135-37 (1992). State court
jury trials are on the docket longer than federal court jury trials. Theodore Eisenberg, John Goerdt, Brian
Ostrom & David Rottman, Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical Portrait, 19
Seattle L. Rev. 433, 449 (1996). Actual time in trial is on average longer in jury-tried cases than in judgetried cases. Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2001: Civil Trial
Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001 (April 2004), at 8 (4.3 days vs. 1.9 days).
12
These awards, like many large awards, often are reduced or reversed. See, e.g., TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 464 (1993) (jury awarded $10 million in business dispute);
Micro/Vest v. Computerland (estimated $400 million jury award), as reported in Computerland, N.Y.
Times, June 4, 1985, and in Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide, 33 J.
Legal Stud. 1, 7-8 (2006); 50-Off Stores, Inc. v. Banques Paribas (Suisse), S.A., 180 F.3d 247 (5th Cir.
1999) (jury awarded in excess of $150 million in compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages;
punitive award struck on appeal); City of Hope Nat. Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc., 123 Cal. App. 4th
306 (2004), review granted, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234, 238 (2005) ($300,164,130 compensatory damages and
$200 million in punitive damages awarded in patent royalty dispute); Rubicon Petroleum Inc. v. Amoco
Production Co., as reported in, Amoco Loses Oilfield Suit, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1993 ($417 million jury
award); Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. Six Flags Over Georgia, LLC, 563 S.E.2d 178 (Ga. App. 2002)
11
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litigants may fear that juries will be unable to understand the legal or factual issues in a
complex civil case. For purposes of testing hypotheses in this article, we rely on the
dominant view that businesses are on average expected to be anti-jury. But we also note
that the real-world operation of the legal system casts doubt on any monolithic view of
juries. Depending on the circumstances of a case, business defendants may choose jury
trials and plaintiffs’ attorneys may avoid them. For example, the plaintiffs’ legal strategy
in the tobacco cases that generated the largest settlement in litigation history13 was
initially designed to employ Mississippi’s Chancery division in which there would be no
jury.14
A. Jury Trial Waivers Generally
Businesses’ fear of juries, and jury trials’ likely greater cost than bench trials,
generates the hypothesis that, in a data set of contracts freely agreed to by sophisticated
business entities, we will always, or nearly always, observe waivers of jury trial.
Correspondingly, if a jury trial waiver clause is absent from an agreement, it is reasonable
to infer that the parties viewed jury trial availability as a positive benefit or at least were
(sustaining $257 million punitive award), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 977 (2003); Pioneer Commercial Funding
Corp. v. American Financial Mortg. Corp., 855 A.2d 818 (Pa. 2004) (striking large jury award); COC
Services, Ltd. v. CompUSA, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App. 2004), review denied, June 9, 2006) (striking
large punitive damages award); Amoco Chemical Co. v. Certain Underwriter’s at Lloyd’s of London, 1996
WL 407855 (Cal. App.) (reversing large jury award); IGEN Intern., Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 335
F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 2003) (reducing award of about $505 million by over 90 percent). In MMAR Group,
Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., a jury awarded $220,720,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. A retrial
was ordered based on plaintiff discovery abuse, see Felicity Barringer, Judge Says Record Libel Case
Should Be Retried, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1999, and it is reported that MMAR eventually chose not to pursue
the case. David McHam, Law & the Media in Texas: Handbook for Journalists, available at
http://www.texaspress.com/Lawpress/LawMedia/Libel/TexasLibelCases.htm (visited Aug. 9, 2006).
Thomas Petzinger, Jr., Oil and Honor: The Texaco-Pennzoil Wars (1987) describes the multi-billion dollar
award in a corporate control battle.
13
In the Master Settlement Agreement that ended the states’ civil actions against tobacco company
defendants, the defendants agreed to pay over $200 billion, fully protected against inflation, to the states.
See http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa (visited Oct. 30, 2006).
14
Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and
the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 Tulane L. Rev. 1859, 1860 n.2 (2000); Doug Rendleman, Common Law
Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement, 33 Ga. L. Rev. 847, 894 (1999).
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indifferent as between jury trials and bench trials. The incidence of jury trial waivers, if
it is significantly less than 100 percent, provides some rough measure of the degree to
which preserving access to juries is perceived to provide greater efficiency or fairness in
dispute resolution as compared to precluding access to juries.
Hypothesis: Sophisticated parties will (nearly) always opt to waive jury trials.
B. Contract-Specific Factors
We note elsewhere that commentators have suggested that arbitration clauses will
be preferred, relative to litigation, when the rules of decision are clear and
unambiguous.15 Similarly, contracting parties who seek certainty may prefer to commit
to judicial adjudication to avoid “noisy” juries that are perceived as more likely to
misjudge clear cases. Contracting parties may believe, ex ante, that their litigation
positions will be reasonable and strong. A party who expects to have a strong case may
opt for the presumably more reliable judge to vindicate his position.16 The tendency to
assume the simple correctness of one’s position may be stronger in the case of
standardized contracts than in the case of contracts open to more interpretation. This
suggests that we would tend to observe jury trial waiver clauses in standardized
contracts.17

15

For discussion of the arbitration clauses, see Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Flight from
Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts"
(October 11, 2006). Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 06-023, available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=927423, DePaul L. Rev. (forthcoming); see William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. Legal Stud. 235, 249 (1979).
16
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1477, 1501 (1999);
Clermont & Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge, supra note 11 , at 1135-37.
17
Another factor that may influence the appeal of jury trials is the degree to which a contract is relational.
It has been observed that, “Presumably, expert juries are far superior to lay juries in recognizing and
articulating customary practices that govern particular transactions.” Robert E. Scott, The Case for
Formalism in Relational Contract, in Relational Contract Theory: Unanswered Questions, A Symposium in
Honor of Ian R. MacNeil, 94 Nw. Univ. L. Rev. 847, 871 (2000). Expertise in the relevant contract field
likely appeals to contracting parties when the customary practices associated with relational contracts are
likely to be at issue. They might prefer bench trials to jury trials on the theory that judges are more like

8

More generally, it is reasonable to expect that different contract types provide
varying incentives for the parties to welcome or reject possible jury adjudication. An
employment contract may raise fears in an employer’s mind (or hope in the employee’s
mind) of a runaway jury awarding huge amounts to a sympathetic employee.

An

underwriting agreement between a securities issuer and an underwriter may trigger less
fear of a jury siding with a sympathetic plaintiff.
Hypotheses:
1. Jury waiver clauses will be more commonly observed when contracts are
standardized than when they are individually negotiated.
2. Jury waiver clauses will vary by contract type.
A contract that designates a forum opts in to a jury pool. Expectations about the
potential jury pool ought to be associated with including a jury trial waiver clause. We
therefore expect jury trial waiver rates to vary by choice of forum. The state law chosen,
like the forum, may reflect views about the characteristics of juries in the jurisdiction
chosen compared to other jurisdictions. If the parties believe a state’s jury system is
expert juries than are juries. But see Ian R. MacNeil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries,
in Symposium, supra, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 877, 906 (2000) (“Even in equity, such courts [of general
jurisdiction with their nonspecialist judges] are relatively poorly equipped to deal with implementation of
living-contract norms, as compared to mediators, arbitrators, or specialist administrative agencies.”). It
may be that contracting parties believe a group of jurors is more likely to implement “living-contract
norms” than a nonspecialized judge. It is thus unclear whether one should expect relational contract status
to be associated with the presence of jury trial waiver clauses. This theoretical ambiguity is accompanied
by our inability to observe in the instant data set whether a contract is in fact relational. A settlement, for
example, may mark the termination of a short-term or long-term relation or may be the harbinger of a
continued relation.
We nevertheless crudely coded for relational status based on contract categories. We coded the
following contract categories as more likely to be relational: credit commitments, employment, licensing,
pooling service agreements, and security agreements, and the following categories as less likely to be
relational: asset sales, bond indentures, mergers, securities purchase, settlements, and underwritings. In
models not reported here, we found a positive significant association between relational contract status and
jury trial waiver. The results are a bit difficult to interpret. For low standardization contracts, relational
contracts waive juries less. For high standardization contracts, relational contracts waive juries more. The
latter result trumps the former because many more contracts are characterized as relational than
nonrelational.

9

highly efficient and fair, that might be viewed as reducing the costs of litigation, and
provide a reason to designate a jurisdiction as the choice of law.
Hypotheses: Jury waiver clauses will vary by contract choice of forum and choice
of law.
C. Party-Specific Factors
Juries are viewed as especially threatening to “outsiders.” Non-U.S. parties to
contracts likely fear the U.S. legal system and may be especially fearful of U.S. juries.
For example, one reason for the widespread use of arbitration in commercial contracts is
that people distrust foreign countries= legal systems.18 Foreign contracting parties, many
of whom are unaccustomed to legal systems with civil jury trials, would be especially
fearful of jury trials.
Hypothesis: Jury trial waivers will be observed more frequently for international
contracts than for domestic contracts.
A party’s business location is a logical characteristic to consider for association
with jury trial waivers because business location also relates to where events under a
contract might occur. The location of events influences the governing law and expected
adjudication forum and, therefore, influences the jury pool that contracting parties might
expect to encounter. Similarly, a company’s state of incorporation should be associated
with the likelihood of it being sued in that state. Many causes of action may be brought
in a company’s state of incorporation.19

The state of incorporation thus should be

18

See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Privatizing Civil Justice: Commercial Arbitration and the Civil
Justice System, 9 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 578 (2000). But empirical evidence about U.S. court mistreatment
of foreigners is lacking. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109
Harv. L. Rev. 1120 (1996).
19
E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (for venue purposes, a corporation is “deemed to reside in any judicial district
in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction”).
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associated with increased risk of adjudication in a state’s courts, and exposure to the
state’s jury pools.
Choice of forum, choice of law, place of business, and place of incorporation can
directly influence the expected jury pool. Each of these characteristics directly relates to
the state in which adjudication will occur or in which events leading to adjudication will
occur. Attorney locale likely exerts its influence indirectly, through its association with
one or more of these four geographical factors. The contracting attorney’s locale is
especially likely to be associated with choice of law, choice of forum, and place-ofbusiness.20 For example, in merger contracts New York attorneys are more likely than
other attorneys to specify a litigation forum.21 And an attorney’s location could influence
whether a jury trial waiver clause is used if local practice or custom influences use of
such a clause.
Hypotheses: Jury waiver clauses will vary by place of business and place of
incorporation.
It is less clear whether jury trial waiver rates should be expected to be associated
with particular industries. But it is plausible to believe that some industries likely have
developed more of a tendency than other industries to include jury waiver clauses. And
the reasons for variation across industries likely mirror some of the reasons for intercontract-type variation. An industry with more standardized contracts might seek to
avoid purportedly noisy juries more than industries with more varying contracts.
Hypothesis: Jury waiver clauses will vary across industries.

20

Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller. Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis
of Corporate Merger Agreements (July 20, 2006), NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-31,
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=918735, Vanderbilt L. Rev. (forthcoming).
21
Id.
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D. External Factors
Several factors might generate interstate variation in jury trial waiver rates. One
motivation for waiving jury trials, the presumed cost savings of avoiding such trials,
might vary across states. One observable proxy for costs is time to adjudication. Case
processing time varies across locales.22 A busy metropolitan court system may take years
longer to complete a jury-tried case compared to a bench-tried case and the delay
attributed to jury trials has long been associated with the possibility of jury trial waiver.23
More rural court systems may have little or no backlog for either kind of trial. Empirical
evidence indicates that parties choose between judge and jury trial in part based on the
difference in the two trial modes’ time to final adjudication.24 The local difference
between the jury trial queue and the bench trial queue, holding other factors constant,
should be associated with the rate of jury trial waivers.

The greater the positive

difference between expected jury and bench time to adjudication, the higher the expected
jury trial waiver rate.
Independent of efficiency-based forecasted cost savings, one expects an
association between the perceived fairness of a state’s juries and the rate of jury trial
waiver clauses in contracts connected to a state. The most obvious connection to a state’s
jury pool is through a choice of forum clause. Our data allow ranking states based on the
jury trial waiver clause rates of contracts connected to the states. The Chamber of
Commerce of the United States annually ranks states’ juries’ fairness.25 One measure of
22

For example, our analysis of the Bureau of Justice Statistics data covering trials in 46 counties in 2001,
discussed at text accompanying notes 48-53 infra, indicates that the mean number of months from filing to
disposition was 44.4 in Worcester, Massachusetts and 11.3 in Fairfield, Connecticut.
23
Hans Zeisel, The Jury and Court Delay, 328 Annals Am. Acad. Political & Social Science 46 (1960).
24
Clermont & Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge, supra note 11, at 1145-48.
25
E.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce State Liability Systems Ranking Study, Final Report, Jan. 11, 2002
(Study No. 14966). The Chamber and other business groups use the Chamber’s ranking studies to try and
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whether perceptions of jury fairness explains jury trial waiver rates is whether states that
are perceived as having the least fair juries have the highest rates of jury trial waivers.
We note some limits on what can be expected of state level rankings. Juries are
selected at the county or judicial district level, not at the state level. Treating states as the
unit of observation groups, for example, rural upstate New York counties with the Bronx
and Manhattan. It is straightforward to generate hypotheses as to why these geographic
units differ in their litigation and jury characteristics. Nevertheless some perceptions of
civil litigation performance, such as the Chamber of Commerce’s ranking, exist at the
state level and help supply empirically testable hypotheses.
Hypotheses:
1. Jury waiver clauses will be more commonly observed when adjudication will
be in states with longer adjudication time for jury trials than for bench trials.
2. Jury waiver clauses will be more commonly observed when contracts are
connected to states perceived as having unfair juries.
In addition, some important factors affecting the decision to include a jury trial
waiver are not readily observable. For example, the decision in a specific contract about
whether to waive a jury trial will depend on the parties’ perceptions of the relative
advantages to them of jury vs. judge adjudication. Potential advantages may stem from
analysis of local characteristics and perceptions of judges and juries, from projections
about where adjudication might occur, from contract-specific relative cost projections,
and from other factors that are not available to us.
influence courts to restrict causes of action and constrain legal actions against the business community.
E.g., Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 2004 WL 2125702, Henry v. The Dow
Chemical Co., 701 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2005); Amicus Curiae Brief of Wisconsin Manufacturers and
Commerce, 2002 WL 32699975, Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. America, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 303 (Wisc.
App. 2002).
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III. The Data
The data consist of eleven types of contracts contained as exhibits to Form 8-K
“current report” filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for several
months in 2002, plus a miscellaneous category of contracts designed as “other”. Form 8K must be filed by reporting firms to disclose certain material corporate events or
changes that have not previously been reported by the company.

For eleven contract

categories, six months of contracts, covering the period January 1 to June 30, 2002, were
studied. For merger contracts, the study covered a seven-month period from January 1 to
July 31, 2002.26 We searched all Form 8-K filings and the resulting sample consisted of
2,816 contracts.
The types and numbers of contracts studied are listed in Table 1, together with the
number of contracts for which we had information about the presence of a jury trial
waiver clause. Most of the contract types are self-explanatory. “Pooling and servicing”
contracts are used in mortgage pass-through and other asset-backed securities
arrangements; they represent agreements under which an owner transfers receivables to a
trustee which holds title to and collects the income from the assets and passes the funds
through to investors.27

26

The expanded period for merger contracts exploits our earlier detailed work on choice of law and choice
of forum in merger contracts. Eisenberg & Miller, Merger, supra note 20.
27
E.g., Circuit City Credit Card Master Trust, Form 8-K, Exh. 4.2, Amended and Restated Master Pooling
Service Agreement, Dated as of December 31, 2001, filed Jan. 31, 2002, Doc. No. 02523859, at 21-22. See
generally Thomas E. Planck, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 Cardozo L. Rev.
1655 (2004).
Trust agreements establish these trusts and define certain of their powers and responsibilities.
E.g., First Consumers National Bank, Form 8-K, Exh. 4.3, Trust Agreement Between First Consumers
Credit Corporation, as Seller, and Bankers Trust Company, as Owner Trustee, Dated as of March 1, 2001,
and amended and restated as of December 31, 2001, filed Jan. 31, 2002, Doc. No. 02524022. One assumes
that for many issues that might arise under trust agreements no jury-trial right exists because of trusts’
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Table 1. Types of Contracts Studied (Number of contracts in parentheses)
Asset sale/purchase (314)
Bond indentures (155)
Credit commitments (217)
Employment (111)
Licensing (48)
Mergers (412)

Other (464)
Pooling and servicing (173)
Securities purchase (461)
Security agreements (37)
Settlements (72)
Underwriting (352)

Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 2002 to June 30, 2002 for
all contract types other than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.

Securities purchase agreements were the most frequent contract type (excluding
the residual category “Other”) and accounted for 16.4 percent of the total of 2,816
contracts. Credit-related contracts—bond indentures, credit commitments, pooling and
servicing agreements, and security agreements—accounted for about another 21 percent
of the contracts. Merger contracts were about 15 percent of the sample but note that they
had one extra month of coverage in the data. Together, the contract types offer a
reasonably rich variety of relations. Several types, including the credit-related contracts,
obviously involve substantial financial institutions. Others types, asset sale/purchase and
merger contracts, involve corporate restructurings. Settlements involve resolution of
disputes.

Employment contracts offer insights into jury trial waiver clauses in

agreements between key individual employees and large corporate employers.

IV. Bivariate Results
We test the hypotheses that waivers of jury trial will be: (1) regularly observed in
contracts involving sophisticated business entities, (2) more frequently observed in
traditional link to equity jurisdiction. E.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) (“at
common law, the courts of equity had exclusive jurisdiction over virtually all actions by beneficiaries for
breach of trust”); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (addressing relation between a
claim’s historical origins and the right to jury trial). Drafters of trust agreements may feel less need to
include jury trial waiver clauses than drafters of contracts that can be enforced by traditional actions at law.
We therefore exclude trust agreements from this study on the ground that jury trials as a belief that jury
trials would be unavailable for many trust-related disputes that sought traditional equitable relief.
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standardized as compared with individually negotiated contracts, (3) associated with
choice of forum or choice of law, (4) more frequently be observed in international
contracts, (5) associated with place of business, place of incorporation, or attorney locale,
(6) associated with industrial classification, (7) more frequently observed in states
regarded as having less fair juries, and (8) will be more frequently observed in states with
longer queues to jury trials relative to bench trials.
A. Frequency of Jury Trial Waivers by Contract-Specific Factors
1. Type of Contract
Table 2 reports initial results pertinent to the clause frequency hypothesis. The
principal finding is that sophisticated actors do not systematically flee juries. As shown
in column (2), only about 20 percent of over 2,800 contracts include clauses waiving jury
trials. Substantial variation exists across contract types in the rate at which parties waive
jury trials. Jury trials were waived in about two to six percent of bond indenture,
employment, pooling service, and underwriting contracts but in about 65 percent of credit
commitments and 51 percent of security agreements.
Table 2’s third and fourth numerical columns account for the relation between
arbitration clauses and jury-trial access. When parties agree to arbitrate, they implicitly
waive any right to jury trial. However, unlike explicit jury trial waivers, which are
clearly directed at, and hostile to, the jury as a trier of fact, an arbitration clause
represents a decision to opt out of litigation altogether. So an arbitration clause may
represent a dislike of judges as decision-makers instead of or in addition to juries, or a
wish to avoid other aspects of civil trials not necessarily associated with the jury.
Accordingly, an arbitration clause can be considered as a form of jury trial waiver, but
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subject to the substantial caveat that the decision to forego trials in favor of arbitration is
likely to be based on considerations other than the wish to avoid juries (otherwise the
parties could simply waive the jury without resorting to an arbitration clause).28
Table 2. Summary of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses by Contract Type
No separate treatment of contracts
Arbitration clauses treated as
with arbitration clauses
jury trial waivers
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Contract type
No jury trial
Jury trial waiver
No jury trial
Jury trial
Total
waiver
waiver
waiver
Asset sale purchase (N)
273
41
220
94
314
Percent
86.9
13.1
70.1
29.9
100.0
Bond indentures (N)
152
3
152
3
155
Percent
98.1
1.9
98.1
1.9
100.0
Credit commitments (N)
77
140
74
143
217
Percent
35.5
64.5
34.1
65.9
100.0
Employment contracts (N)
105
6
68
43
111
Percent
94.6
5.4
61.3
38.7
100.0
Licensing (N)
43
5
29
19
48
Percent
89.6
10.4
60.4
39.6
100.0
Mergers (N)
304
108
243
169
412
Percent
73.8
26.2
59.0
41.0
100.0
Other (N)
385
79
357
107
464
Percent
83.0
17.0
76.9
23.1
100.0
Pooling service (N)
167
6
167
6
173
Percent
96.5
3.5
96.5
3.5
100.0
Securities purchase (N)
339
122
291
170
461
Percent
73.5
26.5
63.1
36.9
100.0
Security agreements (N)
17
20
17
20
37
Percent
46.0
54.1
46.0
54.1
100.0
Settlements (N)
60
12
51
21
72
Percent
83.3
16.7
70.8
29.2
100.0
Underwriting (N)
334
18
333
19
352
Percent
94.9
5.1
94.6
5.4
100.0
Total (N)
2,256
560
2,002
814
2,816
Percent
80.1
19.9
71.1
28.9
100.00
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other
than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts. Columns (1) and (2) treat contracts with arbitration
clauses no differently than other contracts. Columns (3) and (4) treat arbitration clauses as jury trial waivers. Row
percents may exceed 100.0 due to rounding.

Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2 show results if one equates arbitration clauses
with jury trial waivers. The rate of jury trial waiver then increases from 19.9 percent to
28.9 percent.29 The vast majority of contracts thus continue not to waive jury trials.
Characterization of the arbitration clauses does not materially affect the contract
28

Interestingly, we find no significant difference in the rate of jury trial waivers based on whether an
arbitration clause was included in the contract. 20.5 percent of 2,449 contracts without arbitration clauses
waived jury trial compared to 17.0 percent of 295 contracts with arbitration clauses (p=0.166).
29
Excluding contracts with arbitration clauses from the calculation yields a waiver rate of 20.5 percent.
30
Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 15.
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categories that most frequently expressly waive jury trials, credit commitments and
security agreements. But other contract categories do materially change. Employment
contracts go from 5.4 percent to 38.7 percent jury trial waivers. Other notable increases
result for licensing and settlement agreements.
2. Contract Standardization
We hypothesized that increasing standardization of contract terms would be
positively associated with rates of jury trial waivers. Our prior work found a strong
inverse association between contract standardization and the use of arbitration clauses.30
We again use an objective measure of standardization by examining the distribution of
the choice of law pattern for each contract type. A class of contract that regularly
chooses a single choice of law likely has achieved a degree of standardization beyond
that of a class of contract that designates many different choices of law.31 And, as shown
below, the results of categorizing using our standardization measure appear quite
plausible.

Highly regularized financial transactions such as pooling and servicing

agreements and trust agreements score high in standardization.

Less regularized

contracts, such as settlements and licensing agreements score low by our standardization
measure.
Choice of law-based concentration used to proxy contract standardization can be
assessed by focusing on three states, New York, Delaware, and California. These three
states account for the choice of law in approximately 70 percent of the contracts in our
sample, with New York accounting for 47 percent, Delaware 14 percent, and California
eight percent. The choice of law for other contracts is widely dispersed across many

31

As we earlier noted, it is theoretically possible for contracts to be completely standardized in all other
terms and vary only in choice of law. But that is not likely to be the general tendency.
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locales and these contracts can be excluded without sacrificing compromising our
measure of concentration. No other locale accounts for even four percent of the choices
of law. As before, we use the degree of concentration among the three leading states to
classify contracts as having high, medium, or low rates of standardization.
Figure 1 shows, for each of eleven contract categories (the contract category
“Other” is excluded from this analysis because of its heterogeneity), the distribution of
choice of law among New, York, Delaware, and California.

It shows that bond

indentures, credit commitments, underwriting contracts, pooling service agreements, and
security agreements all have high choice of law concentrations. For example, nearly all
bond indentures and underwriting contracts designate New York law as the governing
law.
We treat mergers, securities purchase agreements, and asset sale purchase
agreements as having medium concentrations. Each has a concentration (or density ) of
over 0.5 in one state according to the histograms but these three contract types are not
nearly as concentrated as the highly concentrated group.

Settlements, employment

contracts, and licensing agreements have low choice of law concentrations. None has a
density of 0.5 in the histograms.
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Figure 1. Distribution of Choice-of-Law by Contract Type
Bond indentures
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.5
0

Density

1

0

.5

1

Asset sale purchase

DE

Settlements

CA

Underwriting

0

.5

1

Security agreements

NY

DE

NY

CA

DE

NY

CA

DE

NY

CA

Law chosen
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other
than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts. Each histogram shows the distribution of contracts
by choice of law. Contracts designating Delaware, New York, or California law are included. All other contracts are
coded as designating an “Other” choice of law and not used in the standardization computation.

Figure 2 uses the measure of contract standardization to explore the relation
between standardization and the rate of jury trial waiver clauses. The left-hand part of
the figure shows the relation between contract standardization and the rate of arbitration
clause use.

As earlier reported,32 it shows a definite trend.

The relation between

standardization and jury trial waivers is less monotonic, as shown in Figure 2’s righthand portion. Jury trial waiver rates are lowest in low standardization contracts and
highest in contracts with mid-level standardization. Jury trial waiver occurs in 23 of 226
(10.2 percent) of low standardization domestic contracts and in 411 of 2,067 (19.9
percent) of medium or high standardization domestic contracts. The difference is highly

32

Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 15.
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statistically significant (p<0.001). A second set of bars in the right-hand portion of
Figure 2 shows that the standardization-waiver pattern changes if one characterizes
contracts with arbitration clauses as waiving jury trials. The strong arbitration clause
pattern shown in the left-hand portion of the figure tends to override the pattern in nonarbitration-clause contracts.

The resulting relation tends to be the opposite of that

observed when arbitration clauses are not regarded as jury-specific trial waivers.
Figure 2. Contract Standardization, Jury Waivers, and Arbitration Clauses

0
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Contract Standardization & Jury Waiver Clauses
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Contract Standardization & Arbitration Clauses
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0

Jury waiver clause
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Arbitration clause as jury waiver
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Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other
than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts. Contract standardization is described in text and
Figure 1. “Arbitration clause as jury waiver” codes the waiver as “1” when a contract contains an arbitration clause.
Excludes contracts classified as “Other.”

If one excludes contracts with arbitration clauses from consideration (other than those
expressly waiving jury trials), thereby treating them as neither jury trial waivers nor nonjury trial waivers, the initial pattern re-emerges. Then waiver rates are significantly
different in low standardization contracts compared to medium or high standardization
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contracts (14 of 159 (8.8 percent) vs. 413 of 1,870 (22.1 percent; p<0.001)). Thus, of
those who want to avail themselves of the court system, as evidenced by the absence of a
contractual arbitration clauses, there is a tendency to opt for bench trials in more highly
standardized contracts.
3. Contract Choice of forum
We hypothesized that jury trial waiver rates would vary by choice of forum.
Table 3 reports the rate of jury trial waivers as a function of choice of forum. It
aggregates all states chosen as a forum in fewer than 20 contracts as “Other.” Interstate
variation exists, with contracts specifying Illinois as a choice of forum waiving jury trials
over 80 percent of the time and contracts specifying California, Texas, or Florida as the
forum waiving jury trials about one-third of the time. Delaware, Massachusetts, New
York, and Ohio are between the extremes. Assuming that most major contracts in Illinois
have a connection to the city of Chicago, the over-80 percent jury trial waiver rate likely
reflects a view of Chicago juries (although note that there were only 37 total contracts
specifying an Illinois forum).
Interstate variation notwithstanding, Table 3’s most revealing feature is the
distinction it shows between contracts that do and do not specify a forum. All of the
major states specified as a forum by contract have jury trial waiver rates of at least 33
percent. For contracts that do not specify a forum the jury trial waiver rate is only 6.4
percent. Thus, over 90 percent of lawyers who do not specify a forum do not include jury
trial waiver clauses. They are, in a sense, opting in to the court system in all its glory
with possible jury or bench trials. This is the single most dominant class of contracts—
no forum choice and no jury trial waiver—and accounts for 1,607 of our 2,816 contracts.
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A second group of lawyers and parties wants to control the forum but also wishes to
preserve access to a jury trial: they make a forum choice but do not waive juries. Except
for those contracts specifying Illinois as a forum, more than half the contracts that specify
a choice of forum do not opt out of jury trials. This group accounts for 649 contracts.
The difference in jury trial waiver rates between those contracts that specify a forum and
those that do not is highly statistically significant (p<0.001).
Table 3. Jury Trial Waiver Rates and Contract Choice of forum
Choice-of forum
CA
DE
FL
IL
MA
NY
OH
TX
Bankruptcy court
No forum specified
Other
Foreign forum
Total

No separate treatment of contracts with
arbitration clauses
N No jury
N jury trial
Rate
trial waiver
waiver
(%)
47
26
35.6
67
53
44.2
28
16
36.4
7
30
81.1
14
12
46.2
236
223
48.6
12
10
45.5
32
16
33.3
19
4
17.4
1607
110
6.4
146
57
28.1
41
3
6.8
2256
560
19.9

Arbitration clauses treated as jury
trial waivers
N No jury
N jury trial Rate
trial waiver
waiver
(%)
38
35
47.9
58
62
51.7
28
16
36.4
5
32
86.5
10
16
61.5
220
239
52.1
11
11
50.0
27
21
43.8
17
6
26.1
1435
282
16.4
119
84
41.4
34
10
22.7
2002
814
28.9

Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other
than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts. The first three numerical columns treat contracts
with arbitration clauses no differently than other contracts. The second set of three numerical columns treats arbitration
clauses as jury trial waivers.

A third group of lawyers and parties wants to specify the forum, and avoid juries,
but preserve access to judges: they make a forum choice and waive jury trials. This
group accounts for 450 contracts. A fourth, small group, consisting of 110 contracts does
not specify a forum but does waive jury trials. Thus the vast majority who do not specify
a forum fully opt into the legal system by preserving access to jury trials. A fifth group
of contracts opts out of the court system altogether by including a contractual arbitration
clause. Table 3’s second set of three columns shows that this group is at work in about
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nine percent of the contracts and one could appropriately reduce the number of members
in the first four groups to reflect those fully opting out of the system.
Two of the forum choices in Table 3, though infrequent, merit additional
comment. Twenty-three contracts specified bankruptcy courts as the forum, presumably
because one or more of the parties was involved in a bankruptcy proceeding as debtor or
creditor.

In 1994, Congress amended Title 28 to resolve continuing doubt about

bankruptcy courts’ authority to conduct jury trials. If a right to a jury trial applies to a
matter that may be heard by a bankruptcy judge, the judge “may conduct the jury trial if
specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court and with the
express consent of all the parties.”33 The consent requirement does not necessarily mean
that a contract specifying a bankruptcy court forum thereby assures avoidance of a jury
trial. A proper jury demand may result in the withdrawal of the case from the bankruptcy
court and adjudication by a federal district court.34 It therefore is appropriate to include
in the analysis contracts specifying a bankruptcy court forum. An additional 44 contracts
specified a foreign forum.

Jury trials in civil cases outside the United States are

uncommon and one might not expect such contracts to systematically waive jury trial,
because doing so would be unnecessary. But contracts specifying a foreign forum do not
conclusively determine the forum because courts where an action is filed may not respect
the choice. An express waiver of jury trial would further reduce the risk of a jury trial
and the absence of such a waiver therefore can be of importance. In any event, including
these few foreign-forum contracts does not have a material effect on the results.
33

28. U.S.C. § 157(e).
E.g., Michaelesco v. Shefts, 303 B.R. 249 (D. Conn. 2004). Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), a district court
may withdraw cases from the bankruptcy court for cause. The presence of a jury demand can influence the
cause determination. In re Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime Networks, 4 F.3d 1095, 1101 (2d Cir.1993);
In re Kenai Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 136 B.R. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y.1992).

34
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4. Contract Choice of law
As in the case of choice of forum, jury trial waivers may vary with choice of law.
Because choice of law is concentrated in three states, we report the rates of jury trial
waivers for four choices of law: Delaware, New York, California, and Other.35
Table 4 shows the rate of jury trial waivers for the four values of choice of law.
Unlike choice of forum, virtually every contract specifies a choice of law. And, unlike
variation by forum chosen, rather little variation in jury trial wavier rates exists across
choices of law. Table 4’s first three numerical columns show that the jury trial waiver
rate varies by about four percent with 23.7 percent of contracts specifying Delaware law
waiving jury trial compared to 19.6 percent of contracts specifying New York law. The
waiver rates do not differ significantly across the four groups (p=0.357). Greater and
statistically significant variation exists if one regards arbitration clauses as jury trial
waivers, as shown in the table’s last three columns.

Here nearly all of the variation is

attributable to New York’s rather low rate of arbitration clauses.36
Table 4. Jury Trial Waiver Rates and Contract Choice of law
Choice of law
DE
NY
CA
Other
Total

No separate treatment of contracts
with arbitration clauses
N No jury
N jury trial
Rate
trial waiver
waiver
(%)
289
90
23.7
1047
255
19.6
175
44
20.1
659
165
20.0
2170
554
20.3

Arbitration clauses treated as jury
trial waivers
N No jury
N jury trial
Rate
trial waiver
waiver
(%)
245
134
35.4
1002
300
23.0
136
83
37.9
546
278
33.7
1929
795
29.2

Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other
than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts. The first three numerical columns treat contracts
with arbitration clauses no differently than other contracts. The second set of three numerical columns treats arbitration
clauses as jury trial waivers.

35

For contracts that designate more than one state’s law (for example, New York law governs except where
Delaware law applies), we use the first-mentioned state.
36
See Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 15.
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B. Party-Specific Factors
1. International Contracts Compared to Domestic Contracts
Prior research suggests that foreigners may fear domestic U.S. courts, and in
particular U.S. juries, more than domestic parties, and therefore may prefer juries less
than domestic parties.37 Table 5 reports the rate at which domestic and international
contracts have jury trial waivers.

Columns (1) and (2) report results that include

contracts with arbitration clauses without characterizing all arbitration clauses as jury
trial waivers. About 20 percent of both domestic and international contracts contain jury
trial waivers and the difference is not statistically significant.
Table 5. Summary of Jury-Trial Waiver Clauses by Party Status

No non-U.S. party (N)
Percent
Non-U.S. party (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent

No separate treatment of
contracts with arbitration clauses
(1)
(2)
No jury trial
Jury trial
waiver
waiver
2,034
507
80.1
20.0
219
53
80.5
19.5
2,253
560
80.1
19.9

Arbitration clauses treated
as jury trial waivers
(3)
(4)
No jury
Jury trial
trial waiver
waiver
1,829
706
72.2
27.9
166
106
61.0
39.0
1,995
812
71.1
28.9

Total
2,541/2,535
100.0
270
100.0
2,813/2,807
100.0

p = 0.936 for columns (1) and (2); p<0.001 for columns (3) and (4).
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other
than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts. Variation in Total column is due to missing values.
Columns (3) and (4) treat arbitration clauses as jury trial waivers. Contracts in which either party is a non-U.S. entry
are coded as Non-U.S. party contracts. Row percents may exceed 100.0 due to rounding.

Columns (3) and (4) in Table 5 characterize arbitration clauses as waivers of jury
trial. As reported in previous work, arbitration clauses are significantly more common
for international contracts, although still infrequent in absolute terms.38

37

Treating

Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia, supra note 18, at 1120 (quoting statement that Japanese litigants
cannot get a fair trial because of anti-Japanese bias among American jurors).
38
Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 15.
39
One could employ models that include two business locales for a contract. E.g., Eisenberg & Miller,
Arbitration, supra note 15 (considering acquired and acquiring companies locales in study of mergers). But
the instant analysis already accounts for several geographical dimensions—choice of forum, choice of law,
place of dominant contracting party’s business, incorporation, and attorney locale. The marginal
contribution of a second place of business or incorporation is likely to be small.
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arbitration clauses as jury waivers therefore affects international contracts more than
domestic contracts. Column (4) shows that 39 percent of international contracts then
contain waivers compared to about 28 percent of domestic contracts. The result is
statistically significant at p < 0.001.
2. Place of Business
We code business location at the state level. Designating a single business locale
per contract requires considering the nature of the contract.39 For some types of contract,
such as merger, two places of business are plausible, the acquiring company’s and the
acquired company’s. For such contracts, we used what would one might expect would
normally be the dominant place of business. For example, for merger contracts, we use
the acquiring company’s place of business. Table 6 shows the business locale chosen for
eleven types of contracts. Because of the varied nature of the contract category “Other,”
we exclude such contracts from this analysis.
Table 6. Place of Business Assigned to Each Contract Type
Contract type
Asset sale purchase
Bond indentures
Credit commitments
Employment contracts
Licensing
Mergers
Pooling and servicing
Securities purchase
Security agreements
Settlements
Underwriting

Place of business used
Buyer’s place of notice location
Issuer’s place of business
Principal lender’s designated office
Employer’s place of business
Licensor’s place of business
Acquiring company’s place of business
Depositor’s place of business
Issuer’s place of business
Registrant’s place of business
Reporting company’s place of business
Issuer’s place of business

Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all
contract types other than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts. Excludes
contracts categorized as “Other”.

Table 7 shows the pattern of jury trial waiver rates by place of business. Places
of business are much more diffuse than choices of law so we report separate results for
more states in the analysis. Like the previous tables, Table 7 reports the rate of express
27

jury trial waivers and also reports the rate of jury trial waivers if one equates an
arbitration clause with a jury trial waiver.
Table 7. Jury Trial Waiver Rates and Place of Business
No separate treatment of contracts with
arbitration clauses
N No jury
N jury trial
Rate (%)
trial waiver
waiver

Arbitration clauses treated as jury trial
waivers
N No jury
N jury trial
Rate (%)
trial waiver
waiver

Place of
business
AZ
31
1
3.1
24
8
25.0
CA
293
82
21.9
246
129
34.4
CAN
34
5
12.8
27
12
30.8
CO
45
7
13.5
38
14
26.9
CT
36
8
18.2
34
10
22.7
DC
11
1
8.3
10
2
16.7
DE
26
7
21.2
26
7
21.2
FL
85
27
24.1
75
37
33.0
GA
31
11
26.2
28
14
33.3
IL
66
26
28.3
64
28
30.4
LA
19
2
9.5
14
7
33.3
MA
48
26
35.1
45
29
39.2
MD
36
11
23.4
35
12
25.5
MI
20
0
0.0
19
1
5.0
MN
50
10
16.7
47
13
21.7
MO
19
6
24.0
17
8
32.0
NC
40
11
21.6
36
15
29.4
NH
10
2
16.7
9
3
25.0
NJ
63
17
21.3
55
25
31.3
NV
37
2
5.1
36
3
7.7
NY
208
75
26.5
187
96
33.9
OH
29
10
25.6
27
12
30.8
OR
10
8
44.4
8
10
55.6
PA
67
9
11.8
52
24
31.6
TX
169
42
19.9
153
58
27.5
UT
27
4
12.9
22
9
29.0
VA
51
5
8.9
50
6
10.7
WA
38
3
7.3
29
12
29.3
Other
272
63
18.8
232
103
30.7
Total
1871
481
20.5
1645
707
30.1
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other
than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts. Excludes contracts categorized as “Other”. Place of
business is assigned to a single state as described in Table 6.

The rates of jury trial waivers vary from zero for contracts associated with
Michigan to 44.4 percent for contracts associated with Oregon. This variation persists if
one equates arbitration clauses with jury trial waiver, now ranging from 5.0 percent in
Michigan to 55.6 percent in Oregon. But both states have relatively few contracts
associated with them.
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For the states with substantial numbers of contracts—California, Florida, New
York, and Texas each have more than 100 contracts—waiver rates are relatively stable.
For these larger states, the jury trial waiver rates vary from 26.5 percent in New York to
19.9 in Texas. These two extremes do not significantly differ (p=0.108). If one equates
arbitration clauses with waivers, the waiver rate ranges from 34.4 percent in California to
27.5 percent in Texas.

That difference is only marginally statistically significant

(p=0.097).
3. Place of Incorporation
For some types of contract, such as merger, two places of incorporation are
plausible, the acquiring company’s and the acquired company’s (but they will often be
the same—Delaware). Place of incorporation for a contract is assigned using the same
criteria as was used for place of business above. For example, in merger contracts, the
acquiring company’s place of incorporation is used.
Table 8 reports the proportion of contracts with jury trial waiver clauses. To keep
the output manageable and focus on the states with the most incorporations, we
separately report results only for the six states with at least 50 contracts with a
contracting party being incorporated in the state. States with fewer such contracts are
included in the residual category, “Other.”
The table confirms that Delaware of course dominates the number of
incorporations and variation in place of incorporation can therefore only contribute a
limited amount to explaining the overall pattern of jury trial waivers. Nevertheless,
variation does exist with waiver rates varying from 12.2 percent in Nevada to 33.8

29

percent for those contracts with companies incorporated in New York. The differences in
both sections of the table are highly statistically significant (p<0.001).
Table 8. Jury Trial Waiver Rates and Place of Incorporation
Place of
incorporation
CA
DE
FL
MD
NV
NY
Other
Total

No separate treatment of contracts
with arbitration clauses
N No jury
N jury trial
Rate
trial waiver
waiver
(%)
74
12
14.0
916
194
17.5
46
12
20.7
73
14
16.1
129
18
12.2
49
25
33.8
584
206
26.1
1871
481
20.5

Arbitration clauses treated as jury trial
waivers
N No jury
N jury trial
Rate
trial waiver
waiver
(%)
61
25
29.1
822
288
25.9
38
20
34.5
71
16
18.4
105
42
28.6
47
27
36.5
501
289
36.6
1645
707
30.1

Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other
than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts. Excludes contracts categorized as “Other”.
Separately reports only states with at least 50 contracts with the key contracting party being incorporated in the state.

4. Attorney Place of Business
Information about attorney locale is sketchier in our data than is information
about the other geographic factors. Attorney locale is only available for law firms
mentioned in the Form 8-K so we are limited to using whatever law firms appear in the
form with useable addresses. And we could not always link an attorney mentioned with a
principal party to the contract.
Table 9 reports the attorney locale and the rate of jury trial waiver clauses. It
separately reports only states with at least 50 attorney locales. Attorney locale is more
dispersed than choice of law. As shown above, Delaware, New York, and California
account for almost 70 percent of the choices-of-law but they account for much less than
50 percent of the attorney locales. Delaware as a locale for attorneys was not extracted
from even 50 contracts. Even taking into account the greater likelihood of missing data
for attorney locale, New York and California are the leading attorney locales but they
represent only a small portion of the contracts. Table 9 indicates that New York can be

30

identified as an attorney locale in 269 contracts and California can be identified as an
attorney locale in 182 contracts. The large “Other” attorney-locale category makes us
reluctant to conclude whether attorney locale is more or less concentrated than business
locale.
Table 9. Jury Trial Waiver Rates and Attorney Locale
Attorney
locale
CA
IL
MA
NY
PA
TX
Other
Total

No separate treatment of contracts
with arbitration clauses
N No jury
N jury trial
Rate
trial waiver
waiver
(%)
119
63
34.6
34
17
33.3
33
22
40.0
197
72
26.8
43
7
14.0
66
24
26.7
1379
276
16.7
1871
481
20.5

Arbitration clauses treated as jury trial
waivers
N No jury
N jury trial
Rate
trial waiver
waiver
(%)
98
84
46.2
30
21
41.2
25
30
54.5
180
89
33.1
36
14
28.0
59
31
34.4
1217
438
26.5
1645
707
30.1

Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other
than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts. Excludes contracts categorized as “Other”.
Separately reports only states with at least 50 contracts indicating the state is an attorney’s locale.

California’s 34.6 percent of contracts with jury trial waivers is higher than New
York’s rate of 26.8 percent, but the difference is only marginally statistically significant
(p=0.076). Table 9’s last three columns shows that the difference grows (p=0.006) if one
regards arbitration clauses as jury trial waivers due to California contracts’ relatively
greater use of arbitration clauses than New York contracts.40 The lack of significance for
New York attorneys is intriguing given our finding in an earlier study that New York
attorneys were significantly more likely than attorneys in other states to include choice of
forum provisions in merger contracts, thus suggesting that they pay close attention to ex
ante dispute resolution considerations. But such attention apparently does not motivate
them to waive jury trials for their clients at a significantly above-average rate.41

40

Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 15.
Note also the prominence of merger contracts and attorney locale in the branch of Figure 5’s
classification tree (below) when a contract does not specify a forum. Merger contracts are the highest node
under the no-forum-specified node and attorney locale is the highest node under merger contracts.

41
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5. Industry Groups
We hypothesized that jury trial waiver may vary by industry.

A reporting

company’s SEC filing includes its Standard Industry Classification (SIC), which consists
of a four-digit SIC code.42 The SIC system used in SEC filings yields many industry
categories that contain too few firms to allow for reasonable statistical analysis. We
therefore regroup the SIC categories into 17 reasonably-sized classifications.43
Table 10 reports the rate of jury trial waiver clauses by these classifications.
Waiver clause use varies by industry. The table as a whole yields statistically significant
inter-industry differences (p<0.001). The “Finance, insurance, real estate” grouping is
the largest, accounting for over one-quarter of the contracts, and has a low rate (11.3
percent) of jury trial waiver clauses. The “Transportation and utilities” industry has the
same low rate. The highest rate of jury trial waiver clauses, 33.1 percent, is in the
“Electrical and electronic equipment” grouping.

Comparing Table 10 to Table 2

indicates that the range of jury trial waiver rates is much smaller across industry (11.3 to
33.1 percent) than it is across contract type (1.9 to 64.5 percent). Industry practice thus
appears to be less of a driving force on trial jury waiver rates than is the kind of contract.

42

See http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm.
We started with the 28 industry groups used in U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Public Accounting Firms:
Mandated Study on Consolidation and Competition, GAO–3-864, at 111 (July 2003). These were reduced
to the 17 industry groups used in Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen
Different?: An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firms’ Audits of Large Clients, 1 J. Empirical
Legal Stud. 263 (2004).
43
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Table 10. Jury Trial Waiver Rates and Industry
Major industry groups

No separate treatment of contracts
with arbitration clauses
N No jury
N jury trial
Rate
trial waiver
waiver
(%)
83
18
17.8
19
7
26.9
119
41
25.6
94
12
11.3
82
25
23.4
57
28
32.9
69
28
28.9
673
86
11.3
405
149
26.9
50
18
26.5
24
10
29.4

Arbitration clauses treated as jury
trial waivers
N No jury
N jury trial Rate
trial waiver
waiver
(%)
72
29
28.7
16
10
38.5
105
55
34.4
91
15
14.2
76
31
29.0
50
35
41.2
59
38
39.2
647
112
14.8
333
221
39.9
43
25
36.8
23
11
32.4

Mineral industries
Construction industries
Manufacturing
Transportation & utilities
Communications
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Finance, Insurance, real estate
Services
Instruments & related products
Food & kindred products,
agriculture, forest, fishing
Paper & allied products
18
3
14.3
16
5
23.8
Chemicals & allied products
123
33
21.2
102
54
34.6
Industrial machinery & equip.
78
23
22.8
58
43
42.6
Electrical & electronic equip.
87
43
33.1
70
60
46.2
Transportation equipment
23
5
17.9
19
9
32.1
No SIC listed or SIC missing
252
31
11.0
222
61
21.6
Total
2256
560
19.9
2002
814
28.9
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other
than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.

C. Jury-Trial-Related Factors External to the Parties or the Contract
Jury-related factors external to the contracts and parties should influence jury trial
waiver clause rates. These factors should mediate the effect of the contract-specific and
party-specific factors discussed. The contract type is what it is and the parties are what
they are. They likely do not acquire or modify their characteristics as the result of juryrelated considerations.
In contrast, jury-related factors external to the parties and contracts may directly
influence contracting parties considering jury trial waivers. If the parties perceive juries
to be unfair, that could directly translate into a jury trial waiver regardless of party or
contract characteristics. The parties can retain their choice of law, choice of forum, and
other salient contract terms without the need to subject themselves to what they fear may
be an unfair adjudicator. If the parties perceive jury trials to be relatively costly and
inefficient, such trials can be avoided without altering other contract characteristics.
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1. Perceived Fairness of States’ Juries
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States annually ranks states’ civil
justice systems.44 One measure of whether perceptions of juries are associated with the
rate of jury trial waivers is whether states perceived to have the least fair juries have the
highest rates of jury trial waiver clauses. Figure 3 shows the relation between a state’s
rate of jury trial waiver clauses and large corporations’ (as surveyed by the Chamber of
Commerce) perceptions of the fairness of a state’s juries.45 We associate states with
contracts based on what we expect is the contractual term that most directly addresses the
potential jury pool, the choice of forum.
If a positive association exists between jury fairness perceptions and jury trial
waiver clause rates exists, the data points in the figure should flow from lower left to
upper right.

The lower left of the figure, near the origin, corresponds with high,

favorable rankings in perceived jury fairness and low rankings in arbitration clause rates.
The upper right corresponds with low rankings in perceived jury fairness and highranking jury trial waiver clause rates. The expected relation is observed. Figure 3 shows
a reasonably strong association between perceived jury fairness and rate of jury trial
waivers. A measure of the linear correlation, as represented by the straight line in the
figure, is statistically significant (ρ (correlation)=0.42; p=0.014).46 If one drops contracts

44

E.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 25. The Chamber and other business groups use the
Chamber’s ranking studies to try and influence courts to restrict causes of action and constrain legal actions
against the business community. E.g., Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 2004 WL
2125702, Henry v. The Dow Chemical Co., 701 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2005); Amicus Curiae Brief of
Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, 2002 WL 32699975, Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy Inds.
America, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 303 (Wisc. App. 2002). We use the 2002 Chamber Report because it
corresponds to the year of our contracts.
45
Chamber of Commerce, supra note 25, at 28 (tbl. 15 Juries’ Fairness).
46
This result is based on counting each state as an equal observation and using rankings. Using Kenall’s
tau yields p=0.022. Weighting by the number of contracts for each state reduces size and significance of
the effect (ρ (correlation)=0.14; p (significance)=0.427). But limiting the sample to states with at least five
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with arbitration clauses from the sample or counts arbitration clauses as jury trial waivers,
the results do not materially differ.47
Figure 3. Jury Waiver Clause Rank and Jury Fairness Rank
35

Jury Waiver Clause Rank Based on Choice of Forum
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Sources. U.S. Chamber of Commerce State Liability Systems Ranking Study, Final Report, Jan. 11, 2002 (Study No.
14966); SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other
than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts. Low numerical rankings in the Chamber’s system
correspond to more fairly ranked jury trial systems. We include states specified as a forum in at least two contracts.
The Chamber ranking for the remaining states is not included and the 33 included states were re-ranked from 1 to 33.
Ties in rank are not broken.

2. Difference in Adjudication Time for Judge and Jury Trials
The second external influence on trial waivers considered is the relative length of
the jury trial and bench trial queues in a state. We assess the time on the docket for jury

contracts yields a result similar to the unweighted correlation (ρ=0.36; p=0.090). Contract-level models
that account for both the number of observations and other factors are discussed in Part V.
47
Using the waiver rate resulting from treating arbitration clauses as waivers yields a correlation of 0.45;
p=0.009.
48
The 75 counties from which the sample was drawn include approximately 33 percent of the 1990 U.S.
population; the actual 46 counties contributing data account for approximately 20 percent of the population.
For a summary of the data and methodology, see Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, supra note 1. The
data include information of trial length in large counties in 16 states: Arizona, California, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington.
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and bench trials using trial data from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, a project of
the National Center for State Courts and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (“BJS”). The
data come directly from state court clerks’ offices and include information on judge and
jury trials for all tort, contract, and property trials completed in 2001 in a random sample
of 46 of the 75 most populous counties in the United States.48
Due to data limitations, we can only partially explore the waiver-trial queue
relation. One limitation is that the BJS sample includes only 16 of the states with a
reasonable number of contracts. Second, the sample is limited to the counties in the BJS
sample and is not a representative statewide sample. Nevertheless, the most populous
counties, the geographical units used in the BJS study, likely are the dominant choices of
forum, places of business, and the like. So these counties are more likely to be the
anticipated places of litigation than are smaller counties.
Studying the relation between differences in jury and bench trial queues and jury
trial waiver rates requires quantifying each state’s difference in time-to-adjudication for
jury and bench trials. Comparing this difference across states requires accounting for the
different mixes of case types in the states. If, for example, products liability cases are on
the docket longer than promissory note trials,49 the metric of jury-bench differences
across states should account for the different proportions of each state’s trial docket that
might consist of products liability and promissory note cases.

We therefore ran a

regression model of time-on-the-docket (log) and extracted from it a measure of the

49

Available data indicate that time on the docket differs across case categories. Bureau of Justice Statistics
Bulletin, supra note 11, at 8 (products liability tried cases last 35.1 months compared to an overall tort
tried-case period of 25.6 months; contracts cases take 21.5 months).
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difference between jury and bench trial queues in each locale, after accounting for the
case mix.50
Figure 4 shows the relation between the jury-bench queue difference measure,
coded along the x-axis, and the jury trial waiver rate, coded along the y-axis. The figure
uses only those observations in which the contract generated a choice of forum.
Choosing a forum effectively identifies a jury pool and a basis for comparing the time of
jury and bench adjudication.51 The figure’s left-hand portion treats arbitration clauses as
jury trial waivers. The right-hand portion provides no separate treatment of contracts
with arbitration clauses. Neither portion of the figure shows the expected increasing
relation. The lines in the figure are the lowess-smoothed best-fitting lines.52 No simple
monotonic relation is observed between our measure of jury-bench trial time difference
and the rate of jury trial waivers. If anything, for most of the states for which comparable
data are available, there appears to be an inverse association between contractual jury
trial waiver rates and the difference in jury and bench trial time-of-adjudication. But this
inverse relation does not hold for Illinois. Perhaps the most striking feature of the figure
is the relatively large difference between the jury and bench trial times-to-disposition in
Illinois. Chicago litigants53 must wait substantially longer, about 16 months, for jury-

50

For the case categories used, see Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, supra note 11. The measure of
difference is the regression coefficient on an interaction term consisting of a dummy variable for each state
times a dummy variable for jury trials. The regression model included dummy variables for each of the
many case categories in the BJS data. The interaction term coefficients are the x-axis values in Figure 4.
51
One could also reasonably explore the relation between other contract-specific geographic features (place
of business, place of incorporation, attorney locale, choice of law) and the rate of jury trial waivers. We
expected the link between waiver and geography to be strongest when a forum has been designated.
52
Lowess smoothing is locally weighted regression of the y-variable on the x-variable. Lowess is a
desirable smoother because it tends to follow the flow in the data rather than allow remote extreme points
to affect a local value. See W.S. Cleveland, The Elements of Graphing Data (1994).
53
Cook County (Chicago) is the only Illinois county in the BJS data.
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tried cases to terminate than for judge-tried cases. That difference becomes about 13
months if one adjusts for the different kinds of cases being routed to juries and judges.
Figure 4. Jury Trial Waiver Rate & Jury-Bench Time-to-Adjudication Difference
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Sources. BJS data on trial outcomes in 46 large counties, 2001; SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS
database, Jan. 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger
contracts. The x-axis is a measure, based on regression analyis of the BJS data, of the difference in time-to-adjudiction
between jury and bench trials in a state. The lines are the lowess-smoothed best-fitting values. The y-axis is based on
the trial waiver clause data used in this study.

This assessment of the two external influences on jury trial waivers suggests that
perceived jury fairness will help explain the waiver clause pattern in regression models
explored below, but that the trial-queue information will not. We therefore use only the
fairness factor in the models.

V. Regression Models
Preliminary regression models, not reported here, employed as explanatory
variables the most frequently appearing places of business, places of incorporation, and
choice of law. These variables were consistently statistically insignificant in models that
38

included what appear to be the variables most strongly associated with jury trial waivers.
We therefore focus instead on choice of forum, domestic vs. international party status,
perceived jury fairness, contract-type, and industry classification.
The dependent variable in all regression models is a dichotomous variable equal
to one if a contract contains a waiver of jury trial and equal to zero otherwise. Additional
preliminary logistic regression models, also not reported, yielded results largely
consistent with Part IV’s results except that, inconsistently with Table 3, there was no
significant association between a contract specifying a forum and jury trial being waived.
Table 3 suggests that the presence of a litigation forum clause is strongly associated with
the presence of a jury trial waiver clause. Only 6.4 percent of the contracts not specifying
a choice of forum contain a jury trial waiver clause compared to 40.9 percent of the
contracts that do specify a choice of forum. It thus is likely that, for most contracts, a
decision is made about whether to specify a forum, and that decision is made
simultaneously with, or triggers a related decision about whether to avoid juries in that
forum. A decision not to specify a forum is usually tantamount to not waiving jury trials.
Further inquiry into the existence of a relation between between forum
specification and jury trial waiver was therefore appropriate using methods less subject to
the limitations of logistic regression analysis. Figure 5 is a classification tree of whether
jury trial was waived as it relates to the variables of interest.

Classification and

regression tree (CART) analysis helps explore how decisions branch at what are believed
to be relevant nodes (the variables).54 Each node in a decision tree is split into two
groups, and the data are partitioned into those groups to process the data farther down the

54

Leo Breiman, Jerome Friedman, Charles J. Stone & R.A. Olshen, Classification and Regression Trees
(1984).
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tree. This binary partitioning process can be repeated, with “child” nodes generating
their own sub-nodes. As seen in Figure 5, each node can be the parent of two nodes and
the progenitor of subsequent nodes. CART has the advantage over logistic regression of
being nonparametric and therefore not depending on underlying assumptions about the
distribution of the explanatory variables.
Figure 5 confirms Table 3’s evidence of a strong association between a forum
being specified and the presence of a jury trial waiver clause. A forum being specified is
the highest node in the classification tree, suggesting that other factors influencing the
decision whether to waive a trial are subordinate to the forum specification decision.
This is further support for the common sense notion that the decision whether to waive a
jury trial is not made independently of the decision whether to specify a forum. Common
factors may affect both of these decisions but it is implausible that the decision to specify
a forum is unrelated to whether to waive jury trials.
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Figure 5. Classification Tree for Jury Trial Waiver
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This classification tree provides a nonparametric analysis of the relation between hypothesized factors and the dependent variable, jury trial
waiver, in 2,749 contracts. The prominence (first node) of the forum-specified variable in this tree supports the importance of the relation between
a forum being specified and jury trial being waived. The proportions reported in the terminal nodes at the end of each branch are the proportion of
contracts predicted to contain jury trial waivers. For example, of the 62% of contracts that did not specify a forum, 8% involved mergers, and 51%
of that 8% had attorneys other than from CA, IL, MA, NY, PA, or TX. 0.08 of those contracts are expected to have jury trial waivers. Of the 38%
of contracts that did specify a forum, 14% were credit commitment contracts. The proportion of those contracts that contained jury trial waivers is
expected to be associated with the Chamber of Commerce fairness ranking.

The forum-specification decision, like the waiver-clause decision, is itself likely
associated with contract-type. For example, 69.2 percent of 211 credit commitment
contracts with information about forum specify a forum. That exceeds in rate and number
the use of jury trial waivers in credit commitment contracts shown in Table 2. Virtually
every security agreement that specifies a forum also waives jury trial. Appendix Figure 1
shows that, for every contract type other than settlement, a higher fraction of contracts
that specify a forum include jury trial waivers than the fraction of contracts that do not
specify a forum. It appears that, except for a small minority of contracts (the 6.4 percent
shown in Table 3 to waive jury trial without specifying a forum), the jury trial waivers
come out of the pool of contracts that designate a forum. Appendix Figure 1 also shows
strong variation in the forum-specification/jury-trial-waiver relation across contract types.
The powerful contract-type effects likely influence the decision to designate a
forum as well as the decision to waive a jury trial. That is, as the credit commitment and
security agreement numbers suggest, contract type influences whether to designate a
forum. And the greater frequency of forum selection than jury trial waiver supports the
view that waiver clauses are largely conditional on specifying a forum. Thus, the “No
forum” variable in simple logistic regression models likely is not exogenous. It depends
on other explanatory variables, at least the contract types. A model of the decision to
designate a litigation forum in a contract likely should be solved simultaneously with a
model of jury trial waiver. We therefore simultaneously model jury trial waiver as a
function, inter alia, of whether a forum is specified, and whether a forum is specified in
part as a function of type of contract.
Table 11 reports these bivariate probit models.

Each of the three models

simultaneously estimates a jury trial waiver equation and forum-specification equation.

The variable representing whether a forum was specified, “No forum,” also appears as an
explanatory variable in the waiver equation, as suggested by Table 3 and Figure 5.
Models (1) and (3) provide for no special treatment of contracts with arbitration clauses.
They are included in the sample and coded no differently than other contracts. Model (2)
treats the presence of an arbitration clause as a waiver of jury trial.55 Model (3) differs
from model (1) in its treatment of contract-types.

Model (1) uses our contract

standardization measures as explanatory variables in the waiver equation. Model (3) uses
dummy variables for the contract-types instead.
All models include the “Non-U.S. party” variable, the state forum dummy
variables, and the Chamber of Commerce jury-fairness ranking as explanatory variables
in the waiver equation. In the forum-specified equation, we add to the explanatory
variables the attorney locales discussed with respect to Table 9 above. Previous work
showed that New York attorneys specified a forum more frequently than other attorneys
in merger contracts.56 All models include in both equations, but we do not separately
report, dummy variables for the major industry groups summarized in Table 11.
As suggested by Table 3 and Figure 5, the “No forum” variable is consistently
statistically significant in forecasting the absence of a jury trial waiver. Table 11 also
shows substantial choice of forum effects. In models (1) and (3), Delaware, Illinois, New
York, and Ohio are significantly or nearly significantly more likely to contain jury waiver
clauses than the reference state, California. These results are consistent with Table 3’s
simple bivariate results. The size of the Illinois effect is striking. For example, a
marginal effects estimate indicates that it increases the probability of a jury trial waiver
55

Other models, not reported here, exclude from the sample contracts with arbitration clauses. These
models explore whether the 80 percent of contracts that do not have arbitration clauses waive jury trials.
They do not yield results materially different from those reported here.
56
Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 15.
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by 0.30, conditional on a forum having been specified in a contract.57 The relatively low
rate of jury trial waivers in California may be due to California’s judicial limitation on
the enforceability of jury waivers.58 That limitation was established after the period of
our study but may have been anticipated by sophisticated parties.
The Chamber of Commerce’s ranking of jury fairness is significantly associated
with jury trial waivers in models (1) and (3). As the Chamber ranks a forum less fair,
contracts that designate that forum tend to waive jury trials, thereby confirming Figure
3’s pattern.

Industry effects, not separately reported, as a whole are statistically

significant. In model (1), for example, a test of the hypothesis that the industry dummy
variables are jointly zero yields a p-value of 0.011 in the waiver equation and 0.025 in the
forum equation. Electrical and electronic equipment companies are the most likely to
have jury trial waivers. Paper and allied products companies are the least likely.
Model (1) also includes our measures of contract standardization, as represented
by the dummy variables “High standardization” and “Medium standardization,” with
“Low standardization” as the reference category. Both standardization variables are
associated with increased likelihood of a jury trial waiver clause and the High
standardization variable is statistically significant. But the sign on High standardization
variable changes in model (2), in which arbitration clauses are treated as jury trial
waivers. This is consistent with Figure 2’s showing that the relation between contract
standardization and arbitration clause rates differs from the relation between
standardization and jury trial waiver rates. In model (3)’s waiver equation, several of the
contract-type dummy variables are statistically significant and the results are largely

57

Figure 5 suggests that the Illinois effect is felt most prominently, highest up in the classification tree, in
securities purchase contracts.
58
See note 1 supra.
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consistent with Table 2’s description of the relation between contract-types and jury trial
waiver.
Some results change in size and/or direction in model (2), which treats arbitration
clauses as the equivalent of jury trial waivers. Model (2)’s coefficient for “Non-U.S.
party” shows that international contracts are marginally significantly more likely than
domestic contracts to avoid jury trials by either arbitration clauses or jury trial waiver
clauses. The opposite sign on this variable in models (1) and (3) shows that this effect is
entirely attributable to the treatment of contracts with arbitration clauses. When they are
not treated as jury trial waivers, international contracts are less likely than domestic
contracts to contain jury trial waivers.
In the forum equations, many contract types are strongly and significantly
associated with whether a forum is specified. These variables’ prominence in both
equations is consistent with many of the contract-type variables appearing in the upper
nodes of Figure 5’s classification tree. The forum equations’ attorney locale dummy
variables, most of which are statistically significant from the reference category, “Other
or unknown attorney locale.” In all three models, a parameter measuring the correlations
of the residuals in the two equations, suggests that one can reject the hypothesis that the
equations are independent (p<0.001), thus supporting the use of the multiple equation
models over single equation models.
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Table 11. Bivariate Probit Models of Jury Trial Waiver, No Forum Selection
Non-U.S. party
No forum
DE forum
FL forum
IL forum
MA forum
NY forum
OH forum
TX forum
Other forum
High standardization
Medium standardization
Chamber fairness rank
Asset sale purchase

(1) No separate arbitration
clause treatment
Jury trial waiver No forum
-0.085
-0.012
(0.84)
(0.12)
-1.551**
(5.68)
0.836**
(3.15)
0.324+
(1.79)
0.901**
(4.05)
-0.168
(0.71)
0.605**
(4.25)
0.650**
(2.60)
0.030
(0.16)
0.327+
(1.92)
0.273*
(2.19)
0.122
(1.02)
0.022**
(2.84)
0.401**
(4.79)
1.204**
(7.98)
-0.707**
(6.86)
0.497**
(3.81)
0.601**
(3.29)
1.079**
(7.10)
-0.010
(0.14)
-0.274
(1.34)
0.128
(0.87)
0.742**
(7.99)
-0.267**
(2.87)
-0.227
(1.37)
-0.585**
(3.63)
-0.317**
(3.95)
-0.046
(0.28)
-0.369**
(3.19)

(2) Arbitration clauses treated as
waivers
Jury trial waiver
No forum
0.178+
-0.022
(1.78)
(0.22)
-1.035**
(3.31)
0.816**
(2.62)
0.086
(0.41)
0.974**
(3.67)
0.102
(0.37)
0.602**
(3.61)
0.672*
(2.31)
0.097
(0.50)
0.364+
(1.80)
-0.488**
(4.65)
-0.246*
(2.40)
0.022*
(2.45)
0.369**
(4.18)
1.269**
(8.36)
-0.717**
(7.01)
0.417**
(2.99)
0.525**
(2.66)
1.108**
(7.12)
0.033
(0.42)
-0.310
(1.59)
0.368*
(2.42)
0.720**
(7.51)
-0.285**
(3.06)
-0.222
(1.34)
-0.633**
(3.74)
-0.320**
(3.99)
-0.012
(0.07)
-0.410**
(3.37)

(3) No separate treatment of
arbitration clauses
Jury trial waiver
No forum
-0.156
-0.043
(1.53)
(0.48)
-1.134**
(2.79)
0.898*
(2.52)
0.254
(1.09)
1.105**
(4.21)
0.250
(0.92)
0.690**
(3.71)
0.606+
(1.92)
-0.288
(1.24)
0.200
(0.88)

0.023*
(2.21)
-0.207
(1.54)
-0.682**
(2.69)
0.643**
(4.69)
-0.523*
(2.32)
-0.185
(0.53)
-0.362
(1.63)
-0.110
(1.09)
0.741**
(3.08)
-0.221
(1.03)
-0.641**
(3.87)

0.332**
(3.20)
Bond indentures
1.167**
(7.36)
Credit commitments
-0.604**
(5.29)
Employment contracts
0.428**
(2.91)
Licensing
0.542*
(2.38)
Pooling service
1.041**
(6.49)
Securities purchase
-0.055
(0.62)
Security agreements
-0.073
(0.32)
Settlements
0.078
(0.47)
Underwriting
0.594**
(5.71)
CA attorney
-0.324**
(3.26)
IL attorney
-0.321+
(1.82)
MA attorney
-0.664**
(3.55)
NY attorney
-0.440**
(4.90)
PA attorney
-0.081
(0.44)
TX attorney
-0.499**
(3.63)
Other contract
0.030
0.208*
(0.28)
(2.19)
Observations
2274
2274
2274
2274
2723
2723
Constants included in models but not reported; contract type “Other” omitted from models (1) and (2).. Reference categories: choice
of forum=California, contract type=mergers, attorney locale=”Other.” Robust z statistics in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * at
5%, ** at 1%. Models include probability weights to account for the one month of additional sampling of merger contracts and
include, but do not report dummy variables for industry groups. Sources. U.S. Chamber of Commerce State Liability Systems
Ranking Study, Final Report, Jan. 11, 2002 (Study No. 14966); SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 2002 to
June 30, 2002 for contracts other than mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for mergers.
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VI. Discussion of Results
Parts IV and V contain two separable classes of results. The first and principal
result is that sophisticated parties tend to preserve access to jury trials when they could
agree to avoid the risks of such trials. Second are a set of results suggesting the factors
that influence the decision to include contract clauses waiving jury trials. These results
can provide a deeper understanding of the minority of contracts in which sophisticated
parties voluntarily shun juries.
A. Contracting Parties’ Preservation of Access to Jury Trials
A rich academic literature explores the possible advantages and disadvantages of
juries as finders of fact in American litigation. One set of studies raises questions about
the efficiency or fairness of the jury. For example, studies suggest that juries may give
undue weight to eyewitness testimony,59 statements against interest60 and expert
opinions,61 and may unduly discount forensic evidence such as DNA matches.62 Juries
may misunderstand circumstantial evidence63 or fail to reach a correct result in
circumstantial cases even when they understand the probative value of the evidence.64
Jurors may be influenced by the personality of the lawyers, the physical appearance of
59

See, e.g., J.C. Brigham & R.K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of
Eyewitness Identifications, 7 Law & Hum. Behav. 19 (1983) (mock jurors predicted that eyewitness
testimony was 71% accurate when actual accuracy rate was only 13%); Gary L. Walls, et. al., Accuracy,
Confidence and Jury Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. Applied Psychology 440 (1979). Juries
may be especially swayed if the expert couches his or her testimony in highly technical terms. See Irwin A.
Horowitz, Kenneth S. Bordens, Elizabeth Victor, Martin J. Bourgeois & Lynne Forster Lee, The Effects of
Complexity on Jurors' Verdicts and Construction of Evidence, 86 J. Applied Psychol. 641, 649 (2001).
60
Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 American Psychologist 221 (1997).
61
Allan Raitz, Edith Greene, Jane Goodman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Determining Damages: The Influence
of Expert Testimony on Jurors’ Decision Making, 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 385, 393 (1990).
62
Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, Jury Understanding of DNA Evidence: An Empirical Assessment of
Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Small Random Match Probability (October 17,
2003), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=462880 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.462880
63
See, e.g., William C. Thompson & Edward Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal
Trials, 11 Law & Hum. Behav. 167 (66% of mock jurors significantly underestimated the probative value
of blood evidence).
64
See, e.g., Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?, 62
Personality and Social Psychology 739 (1992).
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the parties,65 or the size of the requested damages award,66 and may decide on the basis of
inappropriate factors such as dislike for business litigants67 or moral judgments about a
party’s conduct.68 Jurors may be subject to cognitive shortcomings such as hindsight
bias,69 imperfect attention spans,70 limited memories, confusion as to the identities of
multiple plaintiffs,71 and inability to understand or implement the trial court’s instructions
on the law.72 In consequence, they may reach dramatically different results in similar
cases, and, occasionally, award damages that are hard to justify based on the facts of a
case.73
Other studies evince a more optimistic assessment of the value and accuracy of
jury decisions. For example, despite the widespread belief that jury awards of punitive
damages are arbitrary and excessive, numerous studies find that jury awards of punitive
damages are not increasing in frequency or size and are not arbitrary.74 Treatment of

65

See, e.g., Catherine T. Harris, Ralph Peeples & Thomas B. Metzloff, Placing “Standard of Care” in
Context: The Impact of Witness Potential and Attorney Reputation in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 3 J.
Empirical Legal Stud. 467 (2006) (when liability was rated as uncertain or unlikely, strategic variables such
as perceived witness potential and the reputation of the plaintiff’s counsel were significant predictors of
case outcome); Robert J. MacCoun, The Emergence of Extralegal Bias During Jury Deliberation, 17 Crim.
Just. & Behav. 303, 311 (1990) (finding that mock juries were more likely to acquit when the defendant
was physically attractive).
66
Cass Sunstein, et al., Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide (2002); Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H.
Bornstein, The More You Ask for, the More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 Applied
Cognitive Psychol. 519, 538 (1996).
67
Sunstein et al., supra note 66.
68
Edith Greene, Michael Johns & Alison Smith, The Effects of Defendant Conduct on Jury Damage
Awards, 86 J. Applied Psychol. 228 (2001).
69
Sunstein et al., supra note 66; Susan J. Lebine and Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the
Hindsight Bias, 20 Law & Hum. Behav. 501 (1996) (study participants were more likely to find the
therapist negligent when informed that the patient had in fact become violent).
70
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in Inside the Juror: The Psychology of
Juror Decision Making 42-43 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
71
Lynne Forster Lee, Irwin A. Horowitz & Martin J. Bourgeois, Juror Competence in Civil Trials: Effects
of Preinstruction and Evidence Technicality, 78 J. Applied Psychol. 14, 19 (1993).
72
Sunstein et al., supra note 66; Judith L. Ritter, Your Lips are Moving... but the Words Aren't Clear:
Dissecting the Presumption that Jurors Understand Instructions, 69 Mo. L. Rev. 163, 164 (2004).
73
Sunstein et al., supra note 66.
74
Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Civil Juries and the Politics of Reform 214 (1995) (“punitive damage
award activity suggests . . . the need for . . . skepticism with regard to claims about the increasing frequency
of such awards”); U.S. Dept. of Justice BJS Bulletin, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 1996: Tort Trials
and Verdicts in Large Counties (1996), p. 1 (August 2000) (about three percent of plaintiff winners in tort
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corporations may also be more nuanced than critics suggest: juries do not always rule
against “deep-pocket” defendants, even when the beneficiary of such a ruling would be a
sympathetic individual plaintiff.75 Moreover, the fact that juries may be imperfect is not,
in itself, a sufficient reason for rejecting them as finders of fact, since judges are also
subject to cognitive biases76 and to the influence of emotion or prejudice.77 Indeed,
because there is only one judge and multiple jurors, the possibility of inaccurate results
may in some respects be greater in a bench trial because the group decision process of a

trials were awarded punitive damages; median award was $38,000); BJS Special Report, Civil Justice
Survey of State Courts, 1992: Civil Jury Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties (1995), p.1 (about six
percent of plaintiff winners received a punitive award; median award was $50,000); U.S. GAO, Product
Liability Verdicts and Case Resolution in Five States, GAO/HRD-89-90 (Sept. 1989) 24, 29 (punitive
damages awarded in 23 of 305 cases decided in five states); James S. Kakalik et al., Costs and
Compensation Paid in Aviation Accident Litigation 27 (RAND 1988) (“punitive damages were not paid on
any of the 2,198 closed cases”); Erik Moller, Trends in Civil Jury Verdicts Since 1985 33 (RAND 1996)
(“punitive damages are awarded very rarely”); Mark Peterson, Syam Sarma & Michael Shanley, Punitive
Damages: Empirical Findings 10 (RAND 1987) (fewer than seven punitive damages awards per year in
Cook County and fewer than six in San Francisco from 1960-1984); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 304-07 (1987) (“insignificance of punitive damages in our
sample is evidence that they are not being routinely awarded”); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges,
and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and
2001 Data, 3 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 263 (2006); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive
Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 743, 745 (2002); Theodore Eisenberg et al., The
Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. Legal Stud. 623, 633-37 (1997) (summarizing studies on the
decision to award punitive damages); Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, The Quiet Revolution Revisited:
An Empirical Study of the Impact of State Tort Reform of Punitive Damages in Products Liability, 16
Justice System J. 21 (1993); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in
Medical Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not “Moral Monsters,” 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 975,
981-92 (1995) (punitive damages rarely awarded in medical malpractice cases). A study that suggested no
relation exists between punitive and compensatory damages in “blockbuster” cases is based on questionable
statistical methodology. Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Significant Association Between
Punitive and Compensatory Damages in Blockbuster Cases: A Methodological Primer, 3 J. Empirical Legal
Stud. 169 (2006).
75
See Valerie P. Hans, Business on Trial: The Civil Jury and Corporate Responsibility (2000); Robert J.
MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the “DeepPockets” Hypothesis, 30 Law & Soc’y Rev. 121, 143 (1996) (“existing evidence argues against a deeppocket interpretation of jury verdict patterns”); Valerie P. Hans, in The Jury’s Response to Business and
Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 Law & Contemp. Probs. 177, 202 (1989) (“even in cases involving some of the
most negatively evaluated businesses around—the tobacco companies—juries show remarkable restraint in
judging corporate culpability.”); Valerie P. Hans, The Contested Role of the Civil Jury in Civil Litigation,
79 Judicature 242, 248 (1996) (“The deep pockets explanation, even though it is highly popular in the
boardrooms of America, does not fare well in this set of studies.”)
76
Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 777, 802-03 (2001) (finding that judges
are subject to hindsight bias).
77
See David S. Abrams, Marianne Bertrand, and Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Judges Vary in their Treatment
of Race? (manuscript, April 2006) (discussing evidence that judges may, in fact, display racial bias in
criminal sentencing).
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civil jury tends to control for outliers.78 Thus, to the degree that juries and judges find
facts differently, there is no a priori reason to conclude that judges are the more
accurate.79
Our study sheds light on this debate, at least as it pertains to the value of civil
juries in cases involving large commercial contracts. As noted in our previous work,80
the contracts in our sample have attractive features as objects of study. Because they
constitute or are connected with events that are material to the financial conditions of
publicly traded corporations, it is reasonable to assume that they receive care and
attention during the negotiation and drafting phase, either from the reporting firm's
employees or from outside counsel (or both). Because the contracts are negotiated before
disputes arise, moreover, we can infer that in most cases the contracting parties did not
anticipate the precise nature of any dispute that might arise, and therefore would not
know whether a particular term would help or hurt them in the event of a conflict. Thus
if jury trials create greater uncertainty or generate higher costs than other mechanisms for
resolving disputes, well-informed and sophisticated parties may be expected to forego
them as a matter of course. On the other hand, if jury trials are not perceived to be
inferior to other dispute-resolution mechanisms, then such parties will not uniformly opt
out. In the absence of significant transactions costs or third party effects, moreover,

78

On the other hand, in the case of the jury there is the possibility that group pressures could negatively
affect the reliability of decisions. See M. Neil Browne, Carrie Williamson & Garrett Coyle, The Shared
Assumptions of the Jury System and the Market System, 50 St. Louis Univ. L.J. 425, 466 (2006).
79
Empirical evidence suggests that there are systematic differences between judges and juries as
factfinders, even though there is a large area of agreement between them. For example, judges tend to be
more likely to convict in criminal cases, Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans,
Nicole L. Waters, G. Thomas Munsterman, Stewart J. Schwab & Martin T. Wells, Judge-Jury Agreement
in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven & Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. Empirical Legal
Stud. 171 (2005). But other studies find no systematic differences between judges and juries in the relation
between punitive and compensatory damages. E.g, Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive
Damages,, supra note 74.
80
Eisenberg & Miller, Merger, supra note 20; Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 15.
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parties bargaining for mutual advantage will tend to agree to provisions that maximize
the social surplus.81 Such bargaining includes provisions regarding the resolution of
disputes that might arise under the contract.82

Thus the observed behavior of the

contracting parties – such as the data presented in this study – provides information about
the social benefits as well as the private value of jury trials.
We recognize that the evidentiary value of our study is contingent on several
factors.

First, the alignment between the outcome of private bargaining and social

surplus will potentially be undermined if the outcome of that process affects the interests
of third parties not present at the bargaining table. However, externalities would appear
to be relatively modest in the case of the large commercial contracts under review here;
and even when externalities are present, they have no obvious bearing on the issue of jury
trial waiver.83
Second, the observed contract terms may not align with social welfare if agency
costs are significant – if the attorneys who negotiate and draft the contracts serve their
own interests at the expense of their clients. It is possible to conjecture some agency
costs. For example, if jury trials are more expensive and risky than bench trials, it may
be in lawyers’ self-interest to preserve them as a dispute resolution possibility in order to
81

Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 Yale L.J. 239
(1984). This is true even if a jury trial would predictably benefit one of the contracting parties at the
expense of the other. See, e.g., David S. Steuer, A Litigator's Perspective on the Drafting of Commercial
Contracts (PLI Dec., 2004–Jan., 2005) (If a client lacks significant bargaining power, or for some other
reason would likely have the weaker legal position should litigation arise, its lawyer should retain the
option of having a jury trial.) Even if it is known ex ante that a jury trial would benefit one party at the
expense of the other, if overall it is more efficient than a bench trial, both parties can make themselves
better off by agreeing not to waive the jury, with the disadvantaged party receiving a more than
compensatory setoff in some other term of the contract.
82
See, e.g., Keith Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8
Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 209 (2000) (if option to litigate reduces the joint wealth of contracting parties, market
forces will push them in the direction of alternative forms of dispute resolution); Steven Shavell,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. Legal Stud. 1, 5 (1995) (“parties would tend
to adopt ADR if it would lead to mutual advantages”).
83
In general, an agreement to waive a jury trial would not bind third parties not party to or in privity with a
party to the contract.
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earn larger fees in the event the contract becomes disputed and the drafting attorney is
chosen to litigate the matter. While this possibility cannot be ruled out, it seems strained
to suggest that it often plays a decisive role in the attorneys’ decisions, especially given
that the contracting entities in our sample are sophisticated parties that usually have
access to the advice of capable in-house counsel. Other than such speculative effects, it
is hard to identify a strong self-interest that would induce an attorney to seek or eschew
an agreement on jury trials that would harm the interests of his or her client.
Third, the observed outcomes in our sample may not provide reliable evidence of
efficient dispute-resolution terms if the transactions costs of the bargaining itself prevent
the parties from achieving an optimal substantive result. One hypothesis could be that
the issue of jury trial waivers is one of de minimis importance, so that lawyers negotiating
contracts do not actively consider or decide whether to include a waiver or not.84 We
cannot rule out the possibility that jury trial waivers are simple matters of “boilerplate”
that receive no scrutiny or consideration by the contracting parties, but we consider this
to be unlikely for contracts in our sample. These are large commercial contracts that
constitute all or part of transactions deemed to be material to the affairs of SEC-reporting
companies.

The provisions for resolving disputes under the contract would appear

important enough to receive attention from the attorneys. Jury trial waivers are included
in a significant number of contracts that appear to be individually negotiated (for
example, settlement of disputes). Even when contract in question is highly standardized
84

In such cases, if no mention is made in the contract, a jury trial would ordinary be available in lawsuits
for contract damages. Or if the attorney utilizes a model or form that contains a jury trial waiver, a jury
may be foregone, although without active consideration by the parties. .Jury trial waivers are contained in
some model contracts. See, e.g., Ted A. Donner, Attorney's Practice Guide to Negotiations § 14:22.
Sample business agreement (2006) (“The parties agree that any dispute hereunder shall be resolved by
bench trial and waive the right to any trial by jury hereunder.”); 2 Model Agrmts for Corp Couns § 16:13
(“THE PARTIES HEREBY EXPRESSLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY MAY HAVE TO A TRIAL BY JURY FOR
ANY DISPUTE ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THIS AGREEMENT.”)
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(for example, pooling and servicing agreements), it is likely that the model on which the
contract is based has already been thoroughly reviewed and considered by sophisticated
business lawyers. Jury trial waivers do, in fact, become important issues in litigation, and
have generated a substantial number of judicial decisions.85 Accordingly, we believe it
likely that to some extent at least, the presence or absence of a jury trial waiver in a
sophisticated commercial contract will reflect considered judgments about what
arrangement best serves the joint interests of the contacting parties.
Another transactions-cost hypothesis for the paucity of jury trial waivers would be
that even if jury trial waivers are important enough for lawyers to consider them, the
lawyers do not have access at reasonable cost to information that would enable them to
make a well-informed judgment about whether or not to waive the jury. Thus their
failure to waive jury trials may provide no new information . It is certainly true, as noted
above, that considerable dispute exists among informed opinion about the value of juries.
Yet if business lawyers simply went by received wisdom, one might expect them to
follow publicly expressed attitudes within the business community and preclude juries
altogether. The fact they do not so do — and in fact reject juries far less than half the
time — suggests that they may be acting according to some relatively reliable
information that juries often do enhance the value of commercial contracts.
Finally, strategic factors may also need to be considered when assessing the
degree to which the low rate of jury trial waivers in our sample provides evidence of the
economic value of juries in commercial cases. For example, it could be that transaction

85

See, e.g., cases cited at note 1 supra.
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costs associated with jury trial are desired by the parties as penalties against too-easy
breaches of contract.86
Notwithstanding these caveats, we believe that the behavior of sophisticated
contacting parties with respect to jury trial waivers provides information pertinent to the
debate about the value of civil juries in commercial cases. Our data showing that such
parties more often than not fail to opt out of jury trials suggests that the availability of a
jury trial often enhances the joint welfare of the contracting parties. Thus, our data
provide evidence that juries often provide economic value for the parties and for society
as a whole, quite apart from other reasons that may exist for the institution of the civil
jury.87 If some of the world’s best-advised, most sophisticated legal actors implicitly
recognize juries’ values, the case for anti-jury legal reform is weakened.
B. Explaining the Pattern of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses
Although jury trial waivers are relatively rare, they are strongly associated with
type-of-contract.

The high rates of waiver in credit commitments and security

agreements may reflect lender beliefs that juries are more likely than judges to impose
lender liability.

The low rate in employment contracts may reflect doubt about

underlying enforceability in contests between large corporations and individuals. The
low rates of waiver in the least standardized contracts, employment, licensing, and
settlements, may suggest that jurors’ perspectives are especially valued when problems of
contract interpretation are likely to be less mechanical. Perhaps the parties value the

86

See, e.g., David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking
Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 61 (2005).
87
See, e.g., Hans, The Contested Role, supra note 75, at 248 (observing that at a time when the balance
between corporate and individual responsibility is in flux, juries “reflect community notions of both
individual and corporate responsibility,” respond to changing norms, and convey information about the
public's vision of sound corporate conduct.)
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jury’s perceived inclination to depart from strict contractual interpretations when they
perceive themselves as possibly unfairly suffering from such interpretations.
A striking result is the 80 percent rate of jury trial waivers in contracts designating
Illinois as a litigation forum.

This far exceeds the waiver rate in other large,

commercially important states. Two factors appear to contribute to this result. First,
Figure 4 and the related discussion indicate that Illinois has an extremely long difference
in time-to-adjudication between jury trials and bench trials. Jury trials take substantially
longer to adjudicate in Illinois, relative to bench trials, than the relative time they take in
other states. Although the difference in jury and bench trial time-of-adjudication was not
helpful in explaining the overall pattern of jury trial waivers, the difference likely does
contribute to the Illinois result.

Second, Figure 3 suggests that large corporations

perceive Illinois juries to be among the least fair. The combination of efficiency and
fairness factors may explain the high Illinois jury trial waiver rate.88
Finally, we are mindful that, like our study of arbitration clauses,89 this is the first
study of its kind and it is important to recognize its limitations. The contracts we study
exist in a small slice of time so ideally we would like information for periods before and
after the first half of 2002. The variation across our contract types in the rates of jury
trial waiver also suggests that more information and more sophisticated modeling of the
decision to include such clauses could be fruitful. The details of the relations between the

88

Also of interest at the individual state level is the fairly high rate of jury trial waiver clauses in Georgia.
See Figure 3 supra. This is noteworthy because Georgia’s highest court in 1994 found such waivers to be
unenforceable. Bank South, N.A. v. Howard, 264 Ga. 339, 444 S.E.2d 799 (1994). Yet five of nine
contracts specifying Georgia as the litigation forum included jury trial waivers. Perhaps the attorneys who
drafted these contracts considered that their clients had little to lose from a waiver because in the worst case
it would simply not be enforced and the litigation would be treated as if no such waiver had been present.
89
Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 15.
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contracting parties and the motivations of those drafting the clauses could and should be
studied.

VII. Conclusion
We present evidence that large corporate actors do not systematically flee juries
even though they have the ability to do so, at low expense, by waiving jury trials ex ante
in their contracts. International contracts also include jury trial waivers at a surprisingly
low rate. Contract types are strongly associated with jury trial waivers, with the waiver
rate ranging from near-zero in bond indentures, employment contracts, pooling service
agreements, and underwriting contracts to over 50 percent in credit commitments and
security agreements. Parties appear to vary the decision whether to include a choice of
forum in a contract and then to include a jury trial waiver based in part on the forum
chosen. Contracts specifying Illinois as a forum waive jury trials 80 percent of the time
while contracts designating New York, California, Texas, and Florida as a forum do so
less than 50 percent of the time. Parties tend to waiver jury trials more when the forum
chosen is perceived to have unfair juries.
In the simple economic view, our results suggest that juries can add value to
adjudication in complex commercial cases. The contracting parties appear to consider
the desirability of waiving juries, as evidenced by the greater waiver rates in states that
the Chamber of Commerce ranks as having less fair juries. This overt consideration of
juries suggests that failure to waive jury trials is not accidental; the parties in such cases
likely assign a positive value to the availability of jury trial. Because pre-dispute jury
trial waivers occur ex ante, their relative infrequency provides evidence that juries may
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often confer social as well as private benefits as compared with the available alternatives
of factfinding by judges or arbitrators.
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Appendix Figure 1. Jury Trial Waiver by Whether Forum Specified
& Contract Type
Bond indentures

Credit commitments

Employment contracts

0

.2

.4

.6

.8

Asset sale purchase

No forum

No forum

Mergers

Forum specified

No forum

Other

Forum specified

No forum

Pooling service

.2

.4

.6

.8

Licensing

Forum specified

0

Jury trial waiver rate

Forum specified

Forum specified

No forum

No forum

Security agreements

Forum specified

No forum

Settlements

Forum specified

No forum

Underwriting

0

.2

.4

.6

.8

Securities purchase

Forum specified

Forum specified

No forum

Forum specified

No forum

Forum specified

No forum

Forum specified

No forum

Sources. BJS data on trial outcomes in 46 large counties, 2001; SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS
database, Jan. 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger
contracts.
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